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Chapter 1
Introduction
The mechanisms designed to safeguard financial stability, namely crisis prevention and cri-
sis management and resolution, have gone through great development in the last decades
and have been further spurred by the subprime crisis and its consequences. As financial
stability has become a policy priority far-reaching reforms are taking place these days at
an unprecedented scale of international coordination. These reforms aim to strengthen
the international financial architecture and are also designed to cope with the increasing
complexity, integration and interdependences of financial systems around the globe.
On the crisis prevention front, in particular in macroprudential supervision, public
authorities are pursuing improved regulatory and supervisory policies, comprising a wider
range of financial markets, asset classes and stakeholders. Along these lines, an overhaul
to the current framework to monitor risks in banks and the rest of the financial system
is also taking place, since the existing financial stability analytic toolbox has been target
of strong criticism due to its failure to detect early signals of distress and to anticipate
channels of transmission and contagion after the adverse events had occurred.
Among other shortcomings, techniques of financial stability measurement have suf-
fered from two significant weaknesses. First, the informational properties of most indica-
tors -mostly balance-sheet based and also some market-based-did a poor job in allowing
policymaking to react timely to growing risks in banks’ balance sheets and the rest of
the financial system. Some did even not provide but fuzzy signals and suffered market
freezes. Even though crises are hardly predictable, early signals of market stress should
provide public authorities with some room for manoeuvre to take corrective actions. In
other words, robust financial stability indicators need to contain forward-looking signals
of stress and should also adapt promptly to new information from the market.
Secondly, some risk measures -mostly market-based-did provide some alerts, such as
booming housing prices, excess liquidity indicators and low interest rates. However, in-
creasing systemic risk was not well perceived because most macro financial models over-
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looked default risk exposures and channels of credit risk transmission between banks and
other financial institutions and between the real and the financial sectors.
This dissertation addresses these two limitations in existing literature of financial sta-
bility assessment and develops market-based methods to assess distress risk at individual
bank level, systemic risk in developed banking systems and, finally, risk exposures and
interactions between the financial and nonfinancial sectors.
Being entirely empirical, the chapters below explore the informational potential of
market-based data, i.e. securities and option market series, and recent market-based an-
alytic approaches. In particular, the theoretical framework is largely based on contingent
claims analysis (CCA) and techniques to extract information from option prices. CCA
is an analytic framework based on the Black-Scholes-Merton model of option pricing to
generate a number of credit risk indicators from balance-sheets and equity prices. CCA
has been initially developed to cover the main elements of company risk, namely asset
returns, asset volatility and leverage.
This analysis has been extended in this research to portfolios of companies to evaluate
the risk profile of an entire corporate sector. The thesis also adds to the literature the
information embedded in option prices of individual stocks and sector indices. Option
prices are an underexplored source of information about individual banks and portfolios
of companies. Option prices produce high frequency information about expectations of
market participants and prove very efficient to endow market-based indicators, such as
distance-to-default series or debt spreads, with a forward-looking component. In my anal-
ysis of individual banks, options cannot only streamline the CCA indicators properties but
they can also provide expected distributions of the equity prices and contribute to assess
stress scenarios and extreme events. Applied to entire sectors, option prices information
introduce a proxy for risk co-movements and develop a framework to assess systemic risk
in a timely manner.
Finally, the use of CCA measures with option prices information can be applied to as-
sess risk profiles of entire sectors through time and see how the risk profiles of companies
and sectors with some degree of economic proximity react to shocks within the sector and
to exogenous shocks originated in the financial or any other sector. Given the forward-
looking properties of option prices, this analysis produces a new and powerful tool for
stress testing exercises and complements emerging analytical techniques such as network
analysis.
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Chapter 2
Option-implied Distributions:
Incorporating Information from
Option Prices to the Assessment
of Bank Fragility
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2.1 Introduction
The 2007-2009 financial crisis has highlighted the importance of early detection of stress
and vulnerabilities in individual banks that can turn into a systemic crisis. Standard
Financial Soundness Indicators, specially those based on balance sheet information, have
proved unable to detect ex-ante higher default risk and many market-based indicators have
behaved at best as coincident with the individual and systemic events triggered in Au-
gust 2007 (International Monetary Fund , 2009a; Borio and Drehmann, 2009a). Some of
these indicators have swiftly reacted to distress, but few have shown the ability to provide
additional information about uncertainty or probabilities of extreme movements in asset
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prices. This evidence urges to explore robust instruments of early detection of financial
stress.
To this end, this paper contributes to the empirical literature of quantitative tools for fi-
nancial stability assessment with the analysis of the information embedded in option prices
of banks. In particular, this study draws from the literature of option implied Probability
Density Functions (PDF) to compute high-frequency distributions of individual banks’
share prices and their moments. The properties of this set of indicators are then analyzed
in terms of market expectations about uncertainty, asymmetry and extreme movements
for supervisory purposes. In addition, using PDF-derived implied volatilities, I compute
an adaptation of the Distance-to-Default indicator of stress and assess its forward-looking
properties vis-a`-vis CDS spreads, an increasingly used measure of distress and even sys-
temic risk.
Information from option prices have been extracted and analyzed to guide policy mak-
ers about aggregate market expectations of financial and economic variables, such as inter-
est rates, commodity prices or foreign exchange rates. Their informative content has been
tested in terms of market anticipation or reaction to relevant unexpected market events,
such as elections, wars, etc. Many studies have also applied option prices to predict future
changes and movements or distributions of financial assets in the future.
The development of market-based indicators from option prices is encouraged by the
large development of derivative markets as well. Options on different financial instruments
have been available and increasingly liquid since the nineties, but markets for single equity
options have emerged later and only the trading volumes can be considered liquid enough
in the last decade to implement the PDF estimation approach followed in this paper.
Therefore, this paper contribution is also pioneering the application of option-based PDF
to single equity options.
The use of option prices for financial stability analysis has not been explored extensively
and it has been limited thus far to studies of aggregated equity indices or the properties
of model-based implied volatilities (IV) at individual level. Swidler and Wilcox (2002)
pioneered in this area of research and their study focuses on signals from options implied
volatilities and their ability to forecast future share prices volatilities. They found strong
common movements across banks IV, which could be interpreted as systemic risk, and
also between IV and other bank-specific risk measures. The authors find additionally that
IV information contain additional risk warnings than those embedded in share prices or
subordinated debt spreads.
More recently, Coffinet et al. (2010) also explore the usefulness of IV extracted from
option prices for micro-prudential supervision under a different analytical approach. The
10
authors apply survival models to a large sample of US banks and financial services firms
to assess the occurrence of financial distress, narrowly measured by dividend cuts and
omissions, which usually lead to default, bankruptcy or restructuring. Their results show
that option prices considerably improve the accuracy to detect time-to-failure of distressed
firms and perform at least as well as other indicators used in bank default models. In both
cases, the IV series were model based 1
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, it outlines a method to compute PDF
from option prices for financial stability monitoring and provides a comprehensive analysis
of the properties of selected statistics of uncertainty, asymmetry and extreme movements
derived from the option-implied PDF estimates. This analysis is useful for policy makers
and bank supervisors, as it bundles together market expectations of future risk in the
banking sector in few measures.
Results of this research show that option-implied PDF provide a set of indicators with
rich and complementary information. Their signals share common trends and react ac-
curately to significant market events. They also show common trends across financial
institutions and other market based indicators, which provides a first notion of systemic
risk. The uncertainty and asymmetry measures show a relatively stable behaviour along
the timespan, while the extreme movement risk indicator is more irregular. This may
likely be due to data issues, but the information content of this indicator is also partially
detected by the former two. Finally, the Distance-to-Default adaptation using the IV esti-
mate from the PDF shows that this indicator shares similar information with CDS spreads
and leads it in many, if not most, cases analyzed. This result advocates for a joint use of
alternative market-based indicators to monitor risk at individual banks.
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 summarizes the
methodology used to compute the constant-maturity PDF and their summary statistics,
with some remarks regarding the case of PDF applied to American-style equity options. In
section 2.3, I describe the dataset and estimation strategy. The main results are discussed
in Section 2.4 and Section 2.5 introduces and application of the Distance-to-Default series
that include PDF-derived IV. Section 2.6 concludes.
1Coffinet et al. (2010) use at-the-money interpolated IV from a Cox-Ross-Rubinstein binomial tree
model to take into account dividends and the possibility of early exercise, whereas Swidler and Wilcox
(2002) use a slightly different approach and apply an interpolated IV from near-the-money options, which
is a method used by the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) to compute the VIX Index.
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2.2 Constant-maturity Option-implied PDF
Methods to estimate option implied PDF have developed extensively since the mid-nineties
and have been applied to many different financial instruments but scarcely to individual
equity options, mainly due to data liquidity issues and other methodological constraints.
This study applies this technique for individual banks options thanks to the continuous
development of exchange-traded options in recent years. This section provides a brief re-
view of the literature and describes the adjustments needed to achieve the objectives of
this paper.
Option implied risk-neutral probability density functions are analytic tools designed
to exploit the information potential of options prices. They represent and allow retrieving
the whole probability distribution of different outcomes of underlying assets and tracking
expectations of market participants of these outcomes. The information embedded in PDF
has proven very useful in several applications, ranging from assessment of market events or
policy actions to case studies in different markets. Bu and Hadri (2007), Liu et al. (2007)
and Lynch and Panigirtzoglou (2008) provide a comprehensive review of PDF applications
under different methods and purposes.
Several methods to estimate option-implied risk-neutral PDF in the literature are based
on the Cox and Ross (1976) pricing model for European style options, which defines call
option prices as the risk-neutral expected payoff of the option at maturity, discounted back
at the risk-free rate and holding volatility constant.
C = e−rt
∫ ∞
ST=K
(ST −K) f (ST ) dST (2.1)
where ST is the underlying asset price at maturity T ; f(ST ) is the risk-neutral PDF;
K is the strike price and r is the continuously compounded risk-free rate2.
Both parametric and non-parametric techniques have been developed to approximate
the PDF. A popular parametric technique is the mixture of log-normal functions discussed
in Bahra (1997) and Melick and Thomas (1997). This technique assumes a weighted av-
erage of two or more log-normal PDF as the functional form f (ST ) and fits the observed
put and call prices to predicted prices via non-linear least squares. This method is flexible
and captures the features of distributions, adapting to different stochastic processes of the
underlying asset and thus different shapes, e.g. fat tails, skewness and bi-modality.
This technique also produces parsimonious estimates and it is relatively computation-
ally efficient in terms of the optimization routines. The main drawback for the purposes
2A similar expression can be derived for put options: P = e−rt
∫ ST=K
−∞ (K − ST ) f (ST ) dST . See Bahra
(1997) for details.
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of this paper is the existence of spikes when one of the lognormal PDF collapses, which
is frequent in times of financial stress. This is a result of lack or bad quality of data and
makes difficult to compare PDF and their summary statistics over time. An additional
drawback that prevents an efficient application of this method in this case are the limited
degrees of freedom given the large number of parameters to estimate, specially when deal-
ing with single equity options.
Instead, this paper applies a non-parametric technique introduced in Shimko (1993)
and described in depth in Bliss and Panigirtzoglou (2004, 2002); Cooper (2000) and Pani-
girtzoglou and Skiadopoulos (2004). This technique is based on the Breeden and Litzen-
berger (1978) result, which states that the PDF can be recovered by differentiating Equa-
tion 2.1 with respect to the strike price K twice. Differentiating it a single time provides
the cumulative density function (CDF).
∂C (K)
∂K2
= e−rtf (ST ) (2.2)
At any given trading day, only a discrete and reduced number of options are traded
and therefore a direct application of Breeden and Litzenberger (1978) result becomes un-
feasible. However, as pointed out by Shimko (1993) and Malz (1995, 1997), a continuous
of strikes and corresponding call prices can be obtained according to the following method.
First, strikes and observed option prices are converted into delta values and implied volatil-
ities. Then, implied volatilities are smoothly interpolated using a cubic spline across the
delta-space and the results are converted back into continuous of strikes and call prices.
The CDF and PDF are obtained differentiating numerically. This method stands out for
its flexibility and easy implementation3.
The result of this process are daily PDF and CDF of logarithmic changes of the under-
lying asset, banks’ equity prices in this case, over a given horizon determined by the options
contract maturity. Following Lynch and Panigirtzoglou (2008), these functions allow to
compute summary statistics that provide market expectations of uncertainty, asymmetry
and extreme movements.
Some remarks about this method before its application to the current dataset. First,
Breeden and Litzenberger (1978) result was derived for options European-style options
but is applied in this study for American-style options. Panigirtzoglou and Skiadopoulos
(2004) show that the Barone-Adesi and Whaley quadratic approximation (Barone-Adesi
and Whaley, 1987) can be used to compute implied volatilities in order to capture the
early exercise premium of the American-style options. The conversion between strike-call
price and delta - BAW implied volatility spaces is then computed using the Black-Scholes
3See Galati et al. (2007) for an illustrative diagram of this method
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formula4.
Second, the smoothed implied volatility smile method does not assume any stochastic
process of the underlying price, the Black-Scholes formula is used only to map data from
one space to another. Finally, the interpolation across delta-space, introduced by Malz
(1997), is preferred to the strike price space, since delta space is bound and away-from-
the-money options are put closely to the near-the-money options and it enables a greater
variation in shape of the PDF near the at-the-money point, where data are more reliable
(Bliss and Panigirtzoglou, 2004).
2.3 Data and Estimation
2.3.1 The Dataset
The dataset comprises daily exchange-traded equity American-style options from nine
banks categorized as Large Complex Financial Institutions5. The data covers trading
days between January 2, 2004 and December 30, 2008 for banks with options traded at
Euronext and CBOE and between January 2, 2004 and June 30, 2009 for banks with op-
tions traded at Eurex6. This allows to assess the behaviour of the PDF summary statistics
during the worst part of the crisis and the slow and incipient recovery in early 2009.
All contracts have maturity dates on every third Friday of the expiration month. The
option cycle is March, June, September, and December, all banks in the sample have up
to 60 contract months with a contract size set at 100. Table 1 summarizes general features
of the sample.
[Insert Table 1 here]
The banks in the sample were chosen according to the following criteria. First, all banks
in the sample are very large for any size metric, diversified and, as we know now, highly
interconnected with the rest of the financial system. They conduct operations around
the globe and across most, if not all, financial activities7. Second, they are diversified
across geographies, which is useful to detect the degree of comovement of their summary
statistics across crountries also in option prices. Third, banks were chosen according to a
preliminary analysis of liquidity of their associated options. Bank equity options are the
4Some examples of this approach can be found in Bliss and Panigirtzoglou (2004) and Cincibuch (2004).
As an alternative, Carlson et al. (2005) and Healy et al. (2007) chose to ignore altogether the early exercise
premium, since it only affects too-deep-in-the-money options (Dupont, 2001), that are normally excluded
from estimation.
5Due to data quality, HSBC was dropped from the sample.
6Dr. Torsten Lu¨decke, at Universita¨t Karlsruhe, kindly provided additional data.
7The LCFI categorization combines size metrics and the involvement in the following markets: equity,
bonds, syndicated loans, interest rate derivatives, foreign exchange, assets custody.
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most liquid across sectors on aggregate, but at individual bank level, trading varies and
is generally concentrated within a smaller set of institutions. Finally, as the timespan in-
cludes extreme events, such as bankruptcies (Lehman Brothers), nationalization (RBS) or
major restructuring and bailouts (Citigroup), the option data of some institutions are dis-
torted and therefore produce breaks in the data should be removed for a long term analysis.
Underlying equities’ data are daily closing prices, retrieved from Bloomberg, traded at
the exchanges linked to the option contracts8, corrected for dividends9 and denominated in
domestic currencies. Corporate actions affect the option series, such as corporate restruc-
turing and equity splits or reverse splits. For instance, UBS and Lehman Brothers made
effective a share split 2-for-1 on 10 July 2006 and 2 May 2006, respectively, while RBS
announced a stock split on 8 May 2007, changing permanently their underlying prices and
making necessary an adjustment in the strike prices and other characteristics of existing
option contracts.
The interest rates used to estimate PDF are 3-month money market rates, i.e. EURI-
BOR for euro area banks, LIBOR USD-, GBP- and CHF-denominated rates for American,
British and Swiss banks, respectively. A maturity mismatch is inevitable when using these
rates instead of a term structure of interest rates. Option market makers usually price
options with term structures customized by their treasury departments or generated by
financial data providers. However, 3-month money market rates were chosen because they
fit well the time horizon of the PDF; they are good proxies of borrowing costs, are less
prone to be affected by monetary policy actions, are highly liquid and have little effect in
the PDF estimation methodology (Bliss and Panigirtzoglou, 2004)10.
Raw option data must be filtered before estimation because daily trading is concen-
trated around a narrow set of near-the-money strikes (Clews et al., 2000) and settlement
prices are less informative of market expectations if strikes deviate too much, especially in
the case of too deep in-the-money options. Quotes of less frequently traded options only
may reflect previous days’ traded prices and models from which the notional prices are
derived. Accordingly, all in-the-money options were first discarded, keeping only at- and
out-of-the money calls and puts.
Additionally, this dataset has been filtered to ensure informative PDF. The exclusion
criteria followed in this paper lead to exclude: 1) options with greater than 20% absolute
moneyness11, 2) options with less than five and more than 120 days to maturity; 3) op-
8Multiple-listing may be distortive due to liquidity effects and therefore must be addressed to ensure
reliable estimates. Options may also be multiple-listed but only options traded in main markets were
included in the sample.
9As a result, the underlying shares are treated as non-dividend paying stocks for matter of simplicity.
10Money market rates were retrieved from Thomson Reuters Datastream
11Absolute moneyness is defined as
∣∣K
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− 1∣∣. The threshold in Bliss and Panigirtzoglou (2004) and
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tions for which Barone-Adesi Whaley implied volatilities were not possible to compute, 4)
option prices that violated the monotonicity and convexity properties12; and 5) options
with deltas equal or greater than 0.99 or less than or equal to 0.01.
2.3.2 Constant-maturity PDF
After obtaining a filtered dataset with liquid option quotes for each bank, the BAW im-
plied volatilities are fitted across the delta space from 0.99 to 0.01 with the smoothing
cublic spline method for each trading day and for each one of the active contracts. No
fitting is conducted if there are less than three delta points (from corresponding strikes)
per contract and no pseudo-data points are added to extrapolate horizontally as in Bliss
and Panigirtzoglou (2004) and Lynch and Panigirtzoglou (2008)13.
These interpolated implied volatilities could already be converted into strike-price space
but are subject to suffer from the time-to-maturity effect. This effect occurs when the un-
derlying price decreases as maturity approaches and estimates of volatility in PDF decrease
without real changes in uncertainty about the asset. In order to correct for this, I followed
the methodology described in Clews et al. (2000) and applied in Lynch and Panigirtzoglou
(2008). Accordingly, for each trading day, I interpolate across the implied volatilities of
splines with the same delta but with different maturities14. From this interpolation across
maturities, I choose the resulting 30-day constant-maturity interpolated implied volatili-
ties to generate daily 30-day constant PDF and derive their summary statistics.
2.3.3 PDF Summary Statistics
For each 30-day constant-maturity PDF estimated applying the method described above, I
compute weekly summary statistics15 that provide market expectations in terms of uncer-
tainty, asymmetry and extreme movements risk16. The uncertainty statistic is the 30-day
at-the-money implied volatility, IV, which is obtained directly from the spline inter-
polation. This is a model-free statistic that increases if higher uncertainty is perceived in
the market.
Dumas et al. (1998) is 10% and in Glatzer and Scheicher (2005) is 25%. Other papers filter by time-
adjusted moneyness
∣∣K
S
− 1∣∣ 1√
T
.
12Monotonicity requires call(put) prices to strictly decrease(increase) with the strike. Convexity requires
a positive butterfly spread at a particular strike.
13These authors add three pseudo strike points at each end of the volatility smile in order to avoid
negative or implausible large implied volatilities. For robustness check, I tested this approach but found
no significantly different results.
14This is an additional reason to interpolate across the delta space.
15Averages of the available daily estimates, in order to reduce noise in the data for graphical analysis.
16Lynch and Panigirtzoglou (2008) provide a large set of additional statistics that can be included in
the analysis. However, since they are highly correlated among them and their information may become
redundant, I report only one statistic of uncertainty, asymmetry and extreme movements.
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The asymmetry measure is the standardized risk reversal, SRR, which is computed
as the difference between the 25-delta call and 75-delta call implied volatilities, divided
by the at-the-money (50-delta) implied volatility. This measure informs about the slope
of the volatility smile and is adjusted for changes in overall uncertainty. Even though
Rubinstein (1994) and other authors have largely documented that equity options tend to
show a steep volatility smile after the Crash of October 1987, also called “Crashophobia”,
this statistic has additional signals of fear in the market and expectations of fat tails17.
Finally, the statistic of extreme movement risk is the standardized strangle, SS,
which measures the degree of fatness of tails if the corresponding option implied PDF. To
compute it, I take the difference between the 25-delta call IV and the at-the-money IV, the
difference between the 75-delta call IV and the at-the-money IV, and divide the average
of the resulting differences by the at-the-money IV in order to adjust it for changes in
uncertainty18.
2.4 Behaviour of PDF and Summary Statistics
This section describes the behaviour and properties of the PDF summary statistics intro-
duced in Section 2.3.3. I start with the main properties of PDF implied volatilities across
banks and over time. Figure 1 shows the PDF 30-day implied volatilities (PDF-IV) for
each of the nine banks in the sample. As anticipated, some discontinuities are found at the
beginning of the sample due to less liquidity of option contracts during that early period
of development of these instruments, although is limited to specific banks, e.g. Lehman
Brothers (LEH).
[Insert Figure 1 here]
More importantly, the charts show the common movement of these series over the
whole timespan, with very high correlation coefficients, over 65%, in all cases and with
no distinctive correlation pattern in terms of country of origin or exchange where the
corresponding options are traded. This result is in line with findings in Hawkesby et al.
(2005) about the high interconnection of LCFI across frontiers and gives an illustration of
systemic risk specially since 2007. See Tables 3 and 2for pairwise correlation coefficients
for both levels and first differences.
[Insert Tables 3 2 here]
Table 4 reports the historical properties of the PDF-IV series by bank. The pattern of
IV across banks is very similar. The average IV is around 33% and does not differ much
17For reference, a lognormal PDF has a zero standardized risk reversal.
18A lognormal PDF has a zero standardized strangle.
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across banks with the exceptions of Lehman Brothers (LEH) and BNP Paribas (BN1),
with mean IV’s of 40.4% and 28.4%, respectively. The latter and the second French bank
in the sample, Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale (GL1), stand out for having the lowest dispersion in spite
of the large jumps in IV at the end of the sample. Large skewness and kurtosis coefficients
for IV indicate that the expectations of equity uncertainty for all banks tend to be higher
than the median and that the market participants are prone to make significant changes
in their risk perceptions.
[Insert Table 4 here]
Combining the summary information and the chart, we can observe that the maximum
values of the IV for each bank are found in 2008. RBS shows the largest value (196.8%),
and it coincides with rumours of nationalization in mid October 2008. The second largest
value corresponds to Deutsche Bank (DBK), also post-Lehman Brothers collapse. The
series for Lehman Brothers (LEH) are relatively shorter at the end of the sample due to
its bankruptcy, whereas the IV values for Citigroup show more discontinuities at the end
of the sample at the time of the Federal bail-out. Needless to say, these extremely large
values of IV are a result of a full-blown financial crisis and the dataset only allows us to
observe a mild slowdown in early 2009, after large-scale government actions in the cases
of Deutsche Bank, UBS and Credit Suisse.
In addition to these systemic events, it is important to note that all IV series start
an upward trend in early 2007, as hedge funds were being closed due to subprime-related
losses and large default risks were only building up. Finally, graphical inspection of the
IV estimates allows us to detect accurately particular events for each bank. For instance,
IV series of Deutsche Bank report a sharp increase in mid-2006, as the bank was affected
by the downgrade of bonds of General Motors and Ford, and for Barclays in December
2007, as this institution sued Bear Stearns for hidden losses on investments in a fund.
Figure 2 shows the standardized risk reversals, the measure of asymmetry. As
expected for equity options, historical values of standardized risk reversal tend to be nega-
tive, pointing out to a steep volatility smirk and higher valuation of significant bank share
prices drops. However, with arguably the exception of Citigroup, the charts show that,
simultaneously with increasing uncertainty, large and negative standard risk reversals in-
dicated since the beginning of 2007 an anticipated and extended market perception of fear
of a large collapse in bank equity prices, as it effectively happened. The charts also show
that this indicator becomes very large during specific market events, such as Bear Stearns
and Lehman Brothers bankruptcies.
The charts corresponding to Deutsche Bank, UBS and Credit Suisse show that during
the first half of 2009 the fear perception, though still large, stabilized. This fact, in
combination with a still high degree of uncertainty perception, as measured by the IV
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series, indicates that market participants in options markets did not rule out further
deterioration in banks risk profiles.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
Finally, Figure 3 plots the standardized strangle statistic. From the chart, it is very
noticeable that this indicator is highly irregular in time and heterogeneous across banks.
This result is not entirely surprising and was also found in Lynch and Panigirtzoglou
(2008) for equity indices. Positive values of this indicator point out to fat tails and clearly
coincide in this sample with periods of extreme stress in the sector. This evidence goes in
line with the previous discussion of the distribution of IV from Table 4 but fails to give
further insights.
2.5 Empirical Application: Distance-to-Default
So far, the analysis of option-implied PDF statistics dealt with bank risks in terms of
future movements in share prices returns. Although this approach is highly relevant from
a supervisory point of view, it does not cover additional risk elements such as levelage or
bank asset risks. Accordingly, in this section I explore the usefulness of the PDF statistics
as inputs in other market based indicators of bank fragility. In particular, this application
introduces the estimates of PDF implied volatilities into the Distance-to-Default indicator
and compares the resulting indicator to the 1-year CDS spreads of the banks in the sam-
ple using traditional pairwise Granger Causality tests, following the approach described
in Kim and Chan-Lau (2004).
Distance-to-Default (DD) is a market based risk indicator based on the Contingent
Claims Analysis. It is an indicator of stress based on option theory that assumes that
company value, represented by its assets, is the sum of its risky debt and equity. As eq-
uity is a junior claim to debt, the former can be expressed as a standard call option on
the assets with strike price equal to the value of risky debt (also known in the literature
as distress barrier or default barrier).
In practical terms, the computation of Distance-to-Default19 requires the equity volatil-
ity as an input, normally taken from historical share prices, in addition to market value of
equity and balance sheet information about the assets and the liabilities to compute the
distress barrier. Accordingly, for this application, I will introduce the PDF estimates of
IV in the DD calibration in order to endow this indicator with forward-looking properties
and assess its performance vis-a`-vis CDS spreads20. It is worth noticing that the option
19The rest of data inputs were obtained from: Bankscope for balance sheet data; Thomson Reuters
Datastream for market capitalization and risk-free interest rates.
20CDS data correspond to daily quotes (averaged into weekly data) from 1-year Senior contracts, obtained
from Thomson Reuters Datastream.
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implied PDF and CDF described above also allow to create scenarios according to the
distribution of banks share prices at a given trading day, but this falls out of the scope of
this complementary exercise.
First, DD series are displayed in Figure 4 and show interesting properties. Same as in
the case of the PDF summary statistics, the DD series show common trends across banks
and start a steep downward trend in 2007. In fact, they start to show a downward trend
in mid-2005 but this result is therefore driven by the rest of DD inputs, namely increasing
leverage. Some banks hit the zero barrier, which is a synonym of bankruptcy, and Lehman
Brothers and RBS go deep into negative values of the indicator. This is mainly explained
by the large IV estimates and exacerbated by the falling market value of equity. A zero
DD does not mean that a bank becomes insolvent, it means that if short-term liabilities
are not rolled over and extra profits are not suddenly boosted, the bank will exhaust assets
within a one year horizon and would become insolvent even faster in case of a bank run.
Negative DD means that the failure is very highly.
[Insert Figure 4 here]
Before assessing the forward-looking properties of DD and CDS rates, I compute a
correlation matrix by bank. Table 5 displays these results and shows that these series are
highly and negatively correlated across all banks. As the larger the DD, the greater the
distance of a company from the default point and the less risk or probability of default,
the distress risk of CDS is measured in the inverse scale.
[Insert Table 5 here]
Finally, Table 6 show the results of the pairwise Granger Causality tests21 for different
lags. Overall, I find that the DD indicator that includes estimates of IV from the PDF lead
at least in most cases and for different lags the CDS spreads. For some banks (BNP Paribas
or RBS) this is not the case, which can be interpreted as complementary information
about bank risk from different market-based indicators22. This exercise illustrate the
importance of combining the current set of indicators with other alternative measures of
risk that incorporate additional sources of information, in this case, expectations from
option prices.
[Insert Table 6 here]
2.6 Concluding Remarks
This paper develops a method to extract risk-neutral Probability Density Functions (PDF)
from option prices for a set of nine banks categorized as Large Complex Financial Institu-
21Previous analyisis of unit roots and cointegration was conducted but is not reported.
22French banks also provide only half-yearly statements, which may also distort the forward-looking
properties of the indicator.
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tions. The resulting PDF are used to build a set of three indicators that monitor financial
stability at individual bank level in terms of uncertainty, asymmetry and extreme move-
ments. The time span runs between January 2004 and December 2008 and June 2009, for
some banks. This period covers tranquil times and a full-blown financial crisis.
The analysis of properties of the PDF summary statistics show that option-implied
PDF provide a set of indicators with very rich complementary information. The three re-
sulting statistics show common trends across financial institutions and other market based
indicators. They react accurately to significant market events and are able to detect id-
iosyncratic risk elements. In particular, the uncertainty and asymmetry measures behave
relatively stable along the timespan, while the extreme movement risk indicator is more
irregular due to data issues, but its information content is also detected by the other two.
Finally, an application of this methodology adapts the Distance-to-Default risk indi-
cator using the IV estimate from the PDF and compares its performance with the CDS
of the corresponding bank. Using Granger causality tests, results of this application show
that this indicator shares similar information with CDS spreads and leads them in many, if
not most, cases analyzed. This result advocates for a joint use of alternative market-based
indicators to monitor risk at individual banks and provides useful analytic tools for policy
makers and bank supervisors, as it bundles together market expectations of future risk in
the banking sector in few measures.
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3.1 Introduction
One of the remarkable lessons from the financial crisis generated in the US subprime mort-
gage market is the need to enhance and extend the systemic risk’s analytic toolbox to guide
policymaking. The interest in systemic risk analysis is not that new1 and was driven by
last decade’s financial innovation, liberalization and development. However, the dynamics
1See for instance European Central Bank (2007b) for an interesting overview of the research approach
in the area conducted by the ECB, the Bank of Japan and the Federal Reserve.
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of this financial crisis has triggered renewed attention and operational focus.
The theoretical and empirical work of defining and assessing systemic risk in banking
are still in progress. Accordingly, different approaches have emerged in the literature and
are either replacing or supplementing existing methodologies that failed to capture vulner-
abilities prior to this crisis. Many of these approaches are moving towards sophisticated
portfolio models of risk, where the banking system is considered as a whole and where the
contribution to systemic risk becomes . These models also aim to capture joint risks and
interdependences with the use of market-based information. Recent contributions along
these lines are Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009) and Huang et al. (2009, 2010).
This paper aims to contribute to the literature with a method to monitor systemic
risk in the European banking system based on contingent claims theory. Without strong
modelling assumptions, this paper generates two series of aggregated Distance-to-Default
indicators based on data from balance sheets, equity markets and option markets. The
first series is a simple average of individual forward-looking Distance-to-Default, computed
using individual equity options. This indicator is standard in the literature and informs
about the overall risk outlook in the system. The second series is a portfolio or system
Distance-to-Default that aggregates balance sheet information into a single entity and uses
the option prices information of the DJ STOXX Banks Index. This indicator supplements
the information of the average Distance-to-Default, outlining the joint risk of distress and
embedding interrelations between the banks in the system.
The use of index-based option information also incorporates two innovations in the
literature. First, it makes use of information from an additional liquid market, the equity
index options market. Second, the construction of the indicator avoids arbitrary mod-
elling assumptions or correlation structures among banks in the sample which tend to
weaken its information quality. In other words, the information potential of equity index
options allow the Distance-to-Default indicators to become a forward-looking analytic tool
to monitor systemic risk and interdependences between the banks in the financial system
over time.
The series generated in the paper are smooth, and allow one to tracking the build-up
of risks in the system with a long-term perspective. They are computable on a daily basis
and incorporate up-to-date market sentiment from option prices. In doing so, they react
quickly to specific market events, when volatility of the components of the system increases
and correlations tend to reveal increased interdependences. The option prices information
also enhances significantly the forward-looking properties of the series and makes their
signals timelier than in either literature of market-based indicators or alternative specifi-
cations similar to mine in employing comparisons between a portfolio and an average of
its components.
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 first reviews the contingent
claims analysis’ main features and applications -the supporting theory of this approach-
then makes reference to a specific application of the literature that is a standard tool of
systemic risk analysis. In Section 3.3, the paper provides a detailed description of the
method which produces individual and aggregated series of forward-looking Distance-to-
Default (DD) indicators using the information of the European banking system and its
core systemic components. Section 3.4 reports the main results of the DD series, high-
lighting its main attributes as a systemic risk indicator and its advantages when compared
to possible alternative specifications in the related literature. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Theoretical Underpinnings
3.2.1 Contingent Claims Analysis
Contingent Claims Analysis (CCA) is a framework that combines market-based and bal-
ance sheet information to obtain a comprehensive set of company financial risk indicators,
e.g: distance-to-default, probabilities of default, risk-neutral credit risk premia, expected
losses on senior debt, etc. Based on the Black-Scholes-Merton model of option pricing,
CCA has three principles: 1) the economic value of liabilities2 is derived and equals the
economic value of assets; 2) liabilities in the balance sheet have different priorities (and
thus risk); and 3) the company assets distribution follows a stochastic process (Echeverr´ıa
et al., 2006).
In this context, as liabilities are viewed as contingent claims against assets with payoffs
determined by seniority, equity becomes a call option on the market value of assets with
strike price defined by the default or distress barrier (determined by the risky debt). As
company assets decline and move closer to the default barrier, the market value of the call
option also falls. The distance between market value of asset and the distress barrier is
called Distance-to-Default (DD) and constitutes the financial risk indicator used in this
paper to assess systemic risk in Europe’s banking sector3. Distance-to-Default indicates
the number of standard deviations at which the market value of assets is away from the
default barrier and can be scaled into probabilities of default, if the distribution of assets
were known. Details of its derivation and data requirements can be found in Annex 1.
This method has initially been applied to company default risk analysis and dissemi-
nated by Moody’s KMV -see for instance Arora et al. (2005); Crosbie and Bohn (2003);
Arora and Sellers (2004) - proving very effective in prediction of ratings’ downgrading and
2Deposits and senior debt plus equity in the case of banks.
3This paper is limited to the development of Distance-to-Default series and their application. The use
of the rest of risk indicators derived from this methodology remains for further research.
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company default. More recently, the CCA approach has been extended to both individual
and aggregate financial and non-financial sectors and also to sovereign macrofinancial risk.
Gray and Malone (2008) provide a comprehensive review of methodologies and related lit-
erature.
DD series and other CCA-derived risk measures are forward-looking, easy and data-
efficient to compute at high-frequencies. They are also good indicators of market sen-
timent, relatively less affected by government interventions and they incorporate most
relevant elements of credit risk. Results in Gropp et al. (2004a); International Mone-
tary Fund (2009b) and Tudela and Young (2003), inter alia, show also that DD improves
and even outperforms other indicators of financial stability including bond or CDS spreads.
However, as the Financial Stability Board (2009b) and the International Monetary
Fund (2009b) point out, CCA measures also have some shortcomings, common to most
market-based financial stability indicators and originated in the input data quality. In
particular, they are sensitive to market liquidity and market volatility and also dependant
on the accuracy of the market assessment, meaning that it may be possible that in periods
of high stress in financial markets, they could not be obtained and even if they could, their
signals are unclear. Even if stress signals from DD series were available, the indicator
could at best be coincident with market events, leaving little margin for policy makers to
react (Borio and Drehmann, 2009b).4
3.2.2 Aggregation Methods of Individual Distance-to-Default Series
Despite its shortcomings, the CCA approach has been recommended by the Financial Sta-
bility Board (2009a) to enhance systemic risk analysis as a tool to identify systemically
important financial institutions. The potential to use aggregated DD series to also monitor
systemic risk is not negligible and, in the case of the European and other mature banking
systems, this potential could even overcome some of the weaknesses cited lines above.
Aggregation of DD is conducted mainly through averages of individual DD and some-
times also calibration of individual data into portfolios of banks, which means treating
4Additional methodological drawbacks not tackled in this paper include the assumption of an ad-hoc
default barrier, constant interest rates and constant volatility. Capuano (2008) tackles the first issue
proposing an endogenously determined default barrier that rapidly incorporates market sentiment about
the developments of the balance sheets, while Chan-Lau and Sy (2006) introduce modifications in the ad-hoc
default barrier to capture pre-default regulatory actions, such as Prompt-Corrective-Actions frameworks,
a common feature in the case of financial institutions. Findings in Echeverr´ıa et al. (2009a) show that the
choice of risk-free interest rates does not affect the estimates of DD significantly but their selection has to
be adjusted to the specificities of the institutions and markets of analysis (see Blavy and Souto (2009) for
a detailed discussion in the case of the Mexican banking system). Finally, as for constant volatility, this
assumption is relaxed in some models that introduce time varying -generally GARCH(1,1)- volatility series.
Research in Echeverr´ıa et al. (2006) and Gray and Walsh (2008) are good examples of this approach.
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the system as one large bank (see Annex 2 for details). These approaches are not new in
the literature and the ECB’s Financial Stability Review publishes since 2004 series DD
medians and 10th percentiles of global and euro area Large and Complex Banking Groups
(LCBG)5 . The Central Bank of Chile introduced the methodology applied to the Chilean
banking system in 2006 (Echeverr´ıa et al., 2006) and the IMF used both average and
portfolio DD series in country reports for the euro area and the United States ( Annett
et al. (2005); Cˇiha´k and Koeva Brooks (2009a) and Mu¨hleisen et al. (2006)).
The analysis of DD averages (sometimes also medians or other quantiles) is the stan-
dard practice in the financial stability publications. Simple averages of individual DD are
highly informative of the dynamics of system-wide risks but can be misleading if analyzed
alone since they do not take into account bank size differences and risk interdependences.
While weighted averages or quantile DD partially solve the bank size problem, they do not
tackle the interdependences among banks and therefore fail to react to swings in periods of
financial stress (Cˇiha´k, 2007; Chan-Lau and Gravelle, 2005). On the other hand, portfolio
DD tracks the evolution of the lower bound to the joint probabilities of distress (De Nicolo`
and Tieman, 2007) and enhances therefore information quality of average DD series, since
it takes into account bank size and risk interdependence among banks6. The relationship
between average and portfolio DD conveys therefore a comprehensive set of instruments
to track systemic risk. This joint dynamics works as follows, when the returns correlation
increases in times of market distress, showing higher interdependences, both series tend to
drop and the gap between them tends to narrow. Since portfolio DD is in general higher
than average DD and therefore is a lower bound of distress, the joint movement of DD
series contains relevant information about increasing systemic risk.
The construction of portfolio DD involves an additional assumption, portfolio equity
returns volatility require pairwise covariances. If the portfolio DD is built on the base of
historical price returns, this does not pose a problem. If individual GARCH-modelled or
option implied volatilities are used as inputs, covariances are either neglected or historical
or intra-day pairwise covariances are used7. In either case, the indicator becomes a coin-
cident one and may fail to detect early signals of market stress (International Monetary
Fund , 2009b).
The information potential of aggregated DD series has not been fully exploited, given
the rich data available in mature markets where option markets are active and deep. In-
deed, standard implied volatilities of options on individual bank stocks are used only to a
5See European Central Bank (2005) for the introduction of the indicator in the publication series.
6This holds true in spite of the fact that aggregation of individual balance sheet data does not fully take
into consideration the crossed exposures, i.e. the portfolio balance sheet data are similar to unconsolidated
bank figures
7Most literature use historical covariance series and Huang et al. (2009, 2010) propose an innovation
using high-frequency intra-day covariances to add a forward-looking dimension to asset return correlation.
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limited extent, and implied volatilities from options on sector-based indices are missing in
the literature. The inclusion of individual and index implied volatilities can enhance the
information content of average and portfolio DD series without imposing strong method-
ological assumptions. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 show how this methodology can be applied and
how it compares to existing use of DD to monitor systemic risk.
3.3 Empirical Application
The empirical approach in this paper consists of two steps. First, individual forward-
looking DD series are computed for all banks in sample. These series are then averaged8
and compared to an also forward-looking portfolio DD. The second series is built from the
implied volatilities extracted from the options on the DJ STOXX Banks Index.
Both series are smooth by construction and forward-looking, given the properties of
implied volatilities (Whaley, 2009), and the difference between the two series shows pri-
marily joint risk of distress in the banking system. The two series share a similar long
term trend, showing the overall risk profile of the system. In addition, they also react in a
clear and timely manner to short-lived events of high market volatility without generating
excess noise in the series or affecting the longer term trend.
3.3.1 The Sample
The portfolio of banks includes the largest 24 European listed institutions, 22 of them
headquartered in the European Union and two in Switzerland. The selection reference is
the Forbes Global 2000 ranking from April 20099. All banks in the sample have also been
constituents of the DJ STOXX Banks Index10 over the whole time span of this analysis
and their shares and options are publicly traded in liquid organized exchanges (see Table
7 for details).
[Insert Table 7 here]
In order to justify its systemic importance to represent the whole European banking
system, this portfolio choice complies with several of the size, lack of substitutability and
8This paper reports results using only a simple average. Weighted averages (using individual market
capitalization) have been tried without affecting results.
9The ranking uses an equally weighted combination of rankings by sales, profits, assets and market
capitalization to assign positions. The composition in the top 25 for Europe has remained stable in the
last decade, taking into account major M&A transactions.
10ING Group belongs to the DJ STOXX Insurance Index due to its bancassurance business model. This
institution is however considered as a bank in the Forbes Global 2000 ranking and in most empirical papers
on financial stability at EU level. Hypo Real Estate was originally in the sample but then removed due to
data quality reasons. The sample was not enlarged in order to keep high quality data of individual implied
volatilities.
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interconnectedness criteria listed in a recent report published by request of the G-20 Lead-
ers in April 2009 (Financial Stability Board, 2009b). The sample also includes non-EU
banks because of the pan-European dimension of financial integration.
The bank portfolio accounts for more than 85% of total market value of banks listed
in the reference index over the entire time span of this paper; all banks weigh significantly
in their respective domestic stock markets in terms of market value and trading volumes,
and most banks have multiple listings at major world exchanges. Their aggregated total
assets add up to more than 60% of the entire EU-27 banking sector at end-2008 and the
composition of assets and liabilities and importance of off-balance sheet activities shows a
highly diversified range of businesses.
In addition to the relevant market shares in domestic markets, these banks also op-
erate at a large cross-border scale throughout Europe. On average, around 30% of their
total revenues was generated in a European country other than the home market and over
25% of total revenues was generated outside Europe in 2008 (Posen and Ve´ron, 2009).
Finally, the portfolio of banks constitutes the core of the ECB’s LCBG11, which means
that these banks are not only big and engaged in complex businesses, but also are highly
interconnected to each other and to the rest of the financial system, making supervisory
oversight more difficult.
In order to estimate individual DD series, both balance sheet and market data are
needed between 30 September 2002 and 31 July 2009 (1785 trading days). Balance sheet
data comprise annual and interim data on total assets, short-term liabilities and equity.
The market-based data include daily observations of risk-free interest rates, market capital-
ization, euro exchange rates and at-the-money implied volatilities12. The risk-free interest
rates are 10-year government bond yields in each bank’s country of origin. See Table 8 for
a description of data and sources.
[Insert Table 8 here]
The calculation of the portfolio DD series requires also daily put and call implied
volatilities of options on the DJ STOXX Banks Index under the premise that timely and
meaningful implied volatilities call for prices from an active index option market (Whaley,
2009). These series start at the end of the third quarter 2002, which determines the sample
start of this paper. The end date is set on 31 July 2009 in order to include second quarter
interim reports’ information for all banks. The time span therefore includes tranquil times
11In addition, Deutsche Bank, Credit Suisse, Barclays, HSBC, Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale, UBS, RBS and BNP
Paribas were initially included by the Bank of England in the list of Large Complex Financial Institutions
(LCFI) due to their important role in the global financial system.
12Missing values for Cre´dit Agricole prior to November 25th 2005 and for Natixis for the whole sample
have been replaced for GARCH(1,1) volatility estimates. Infrequent missing values have been replaced for
those from the previous trading day.
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in the beginning, periods of minor stress since 2006, the financial crisis since August 2007
and the recent markets’ recovery and sector restructuring since March 2009.
3.3.2 Calibration of Average and Portfolio Distance-to-Default Series.
Appendices 1 and 2 contain a detailed methodological explanation of the procedure fol-
lowed in this paper to compute both average and portfolio DD series, according to the
literature. This section only discusses certain particularities in the data and approach in
this paper.
Individual DD series have daily frequency. In practical terms, this means the balance
sheet information has to be modified from its original quarterly, half-yearly or yearly fre-
quencies. In this paper, the data were interpolated into daily series using cubic splines. In
the second step, daily default barriers are computed using these new series of liabilities.
The last step before computing the daily average DD series is to convert put and call im-
plied volatilities into an average implied volatility and then calibrate the individual DD.
The closed-form expression for the average DD series is given by:
DD = 1N
∑
DDi ,where DD
i = f
(
Ai(Ei), σ
Ai
i (σ
IVi
i ), Di, t, ri
)
where DD is the simple average of N individual DDi t periods ahead. For each bank i,
Ai is the implied value of assets; Ei is the market value of equity; σ
Ai
i is the implied asset
volatility; σIVii is equity price return volatility obtained from individual equity options; Di
is the distress barrier, ri is risk-free interest rate in the respective home market.
Portfolio DD requires aggregation of the balance sheet data. Since they are denom-
inated in different currencies, these figures are converted into euro before interpolation
using official bilateral exchange rates. The euro-denominated balance sheet data and daily
market values (converted on a daily basis into euros) are aggregated into single series for
the whole portofolio. Risk-free interest rates are aggregated using market value as weight-
ing factor.
Finally, implied volatilities of put and call options on the DJ STOXX Banks Index
are also transformed into daily averages. Using index implied volatilities means in prac-
tice that this paper does not only add a forward looking component to the portfolio DD,
comparable to average DD, but also that no covariance structure is assumed. It is taken
directly from market data, reflecting market perceptions of joint distress risk in the con-
stituents of the reference index, the European banking system. The expression for the
portfolio DD series is given by:
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DDP = f
(
AP (EP ), σP (σ
IVIndex
P ), DP , t, rP
)
where DDP is the portfolio’s DD t periods ahead. For a given portfolio P composed of N
banks, AP is the implied value of assets; EP is the equity market value of the portfolio; σP
is the implied asset volatility; σIVIndexP is the portfolio’s equity volatility obtained from the
index options; DP is the portfolio’s distress barrier, rP is the weighted average of risk-free
interest rates in the N banks’ markets.
3.4 Results
The main results focus on the series of average and portfolio DD series and their difference
as a tool to monitor systemic risk in Europe’s banking system, namely: 1) they focus on
the system as a whole and look at interdependences between banks; 2) they are smooth
by construction, avoiding low signal-to-noise ratios and fuzzy signals, which allows one
to track systemic risk over time; 3) they contain forward-looking signals of distress; and
4) they show quick but short-lived coincident reactions to market events, in other words,
their informative properties are not significantly affected by their ability to promptly de-
tect shocks in the markets.
3.4.1 Aggregated Distance-to-Default Series
Figure 5 and Figure 6 plot together the forward-looking average and portfolio DD series,
their difference and also the DJ STOXX Banks Index as a reference13. As expected,
portfolio DD moves along and exceeds average DD over the entire sample and both series
provide a good picture of past market assessment and future outlook of the banking system
in Europe.
[Insert Figures 5 and 6 here]
Figures 7 and 8 plot together the DD series calculated using only put implied volatili-
ties, since put options are more reactive to market specific events and contain important
information regarding the demands for portfolio insurance and market volatility (Whaley,
2009). As DD series obtained using average implied volatilities are smoother, a valued
property of market-based indicators in the analysis of systemic risk, the results of this
paper focus on them only, although it is desirable that the analysis of short term market
distress takes into account the information potential of put-derived DD series14.
[Insert Figures 7 and 8 here]
13Figure 6 shows the series since 2005 to account for the generalized adoption of IFRS accounting
standards that might have introduced a break in the series due to revaluation of balance sheet items, see
European Central Bank (2006) and Rapp and Qu (2007) for further discussion.
14Put options are extensively used for insurance purposes, i.e. hedgers buy puts if they have concerns
about a potential drop in the markets (Whaley, 2009).
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Distance between average and portfolio DD series tends to narrow when the two indica-
tors are going down (Gray and Malone, 2008). This characteristic is a result of increasing
correlation of underlying stocks’ returns in times of distress and it holds true for these se-
ries as well after February 2007, when the subprime crisis started to unfold, and especially
after the start of the credit crunch in August 2007, when the European banking system
was no longer perceived as “sound”.
In addition, due to different sources of implied volatilities, the difference also narrows
for a limited time during episodes of short-lived market distress while the banking system
still is in healthy shape and also widens during distressed times in response to positive
news. An example of the first case is the credit rating downgrade of General Motors
and Ford in May 2005, when their difference abruptly tightened even though average and
portfolio DD were still at high levels. A second example is the market turbulence in
May-June 2006, where global equity markets are hit by a rise in investors’ risk aversion.
A final example pre-crisis is February 2007, when fears about Asian equity markets and
deterioration in the US subprime mortgages hit equity markets. In all cases, the effect
would not be perceived if only average DD series were portrayed (see ECB’s DD series in
Figures 9 and 10). Symmetrically, positive news is also perceived in the series through
transitory widening of DD series gap during bad times, as in the late 2008, when capital
injections, consolidation and emergency actions were taking place at an unprecedented
scale to ensure solvency in the sector.
[Insert Figures 9 and 10 here]
Another interesting feature of the reported DD series is the fact that they reach their
peak in 2005, long before our equity markets’ benchmark reached theirs (DJ STOXX
Banks Index) and long before the DD series computed using historical equity information
(ECB’s DD series). In addition, they start a downward trend around this date -as noted
more clearly in the gap and its 60-day moving average- that only bounces back after the
first quarter of 2009. This forward-looking feature provides additional support to the abil-
ity in DD of early systemic risk monitoring.
As noted in previous sections, most market-based indicators of financial stability are
targets of criticism after the crisis because of their poor performance during the recent
crisis and their failure to detect early signals of distress in major banking institutions.
Indeed, the ECB’s Financial Stability Review reports the decline of DD series only in the
second quarter 2007 and equity markets remained somewhat stable even after the liquid-
ity squeeze took place (European Central Bank, 2007a). Even if the forward-looking DD
series presented in this section had no predictive power, the figures described above make
a strong argument for the combined use of forward-looking DD series based on option
prices information to monitor the general build-up of risk in systemically important banks
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in Europe.
3.4.2 Properties of the Indicator of Stress
The smoothness and forward-looking features of my DD series are quite evident in Figures
11 and 12, where I also plot DD series that use volatilities generated by GARCH models.
These series are significantly more volatile than the benchmark, even if additional simi-
lar assumptions were made for their estimation15. GARCH-derived volatilities have the
advantage of quick adjustment to changes in the underlying data, but they also tend to
overshoot afterwards. This feature means more noise in the DD indicator, which leads
in practice to a difficult interpretation of its signals and more frequent false positives in
the series of DD differences. As a result, reliability of this approach is reduced in terms
of monitoring systemic risk compared to both the benchmark series and even DD series
constructed with historical volatilities. In addition, the trends in the GARCH-derived DD
series are not as clear as those depicted in Figures 1 and 2 and there is more dominance
of the short-lived market events.
[Insert Figures 11 and 12 here]
Finally, the forward-looking property of average and portfolio DD series derived from
option implied volatilities was econometrically examined running pairwise Granger causal-
ity tests vis-a`-vis the monthly DD series reported by the ECB in the Financial Stability
Review series16. Results are reported in Table 9.
[Insert Table 9 here]
Results of Granger tests provide econometric support to the forward-looking feature
of our series. Table 9 shows that forward-looking DD indicators Granger cause ECB’s
median DD series up to two years, as Figures 9 and 10 suggested. More robust results are
obtained for longer lags in the test using average DD because of 1) the similar method used
to obtain these series; and 2) the effect of transitory volatility shocks in the portfolio DD
indicator is partially cancelled out in averages and median DD series. In spite of this, these
results strongly suggest that -even with the ability of a GARCH model to react quickly
to changes in volatility- there is still a backward-looking component embedded that is
not present in the DD series that incorporate option price information. The DD series
15GARCH(1,1) volatilities were estimated using prices of individual banks’ shares and DJ STOXX Banks
Index since 31/12/1998, adding an observation as daily closing prices become available in order to generate
more realistic data series. The DD series followed the same estimation methodology described in Section
3.3. In terms of the portfolio DD, this means that GARCH volatilities are estimated for the index and
covariances are neglected. Although not reported, Granger causality tests were conducted for average,
portfolio and differences series, showing rejection of the null hypothesis that main DD do not cause GARCH-
generated DD for 5, 10 and 20 day lags, especially for the average DD.
16Average and portfolio DD were previously transformed to match monthly frequency of ECB data and
unit root and cointegration tests were conducted prior to the Granger causality tests.
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constructed in this paper have therefore an important advantage as a tool of systemic risk
analysis.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
This paper proposes a method to monitor systemic risk in the European banking sys-
tem. The approach relies on contingent claims theory to generate aggregated Distance-to-
Default series using option prices information from systemically important banks and the
DJ STOXX Banks Index. The analysis extends from 30 September 2002 to 31 July 2009,
covering both calm times and the current financial crisis.
The portfolio of banks comprises the largest financial institutions in Europe, character-
ized by a high degree of complexity and close linkages to the rest of the financial system.
This approach is applicable to mature economies, where option markets are active and
liquid in both individual equity and equity index option contracts.
The generated series revealed several methodological advantages with respect to tradi-
tional approaches in the literature and other market-based indicators of financial stability.
Firstly, the analysis of systemic risk is notably enhanced if both average and portfolio
Distance-to-Default series and their gap are used to monitor vulnerability in the banking
system over time. The aggregated series encompass the analysis of both overall and joint
risk of distress in the system.
Secondly, results in the paper show that the information embedded in option prices
endow the series with a forward-looking property, allowing for early signaling of distress,
which is not perceived by many other market based indicators of financial stability or even
by backward-looking specifications of similar indicators. The use of implied volatilities
from options on the sector index also helps circumvent assumptions about equity prices
correlations and the use of historical data, which would turn the indicator into a coinci-
dent one. It also helps avoid arbitrary assumptions in the model to capture interdepences
between banks during times of distress.
Finally, the aggregated Distance-to-Default series are smooth and show quick and clear
reaction to short-lived market events without weakening their longer-term informational
content. In other words, they incorporate very quickly market expectations via option
prices that do not distort the overall risk outlook in the financial system.
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Appendix A. Derivation of Distance-to-Default
Given the three principles in CCA mentioned in Section 3.2.1, company value (represented
by its assets, A) is the sum of its risky debt (D) and equity (E). Since equity is a junior
claim to debt, the former can be expressed as a standard call option on the assets with
strike price equal to the value of risky debt (also known in the literature as distress barrier
or default barrier).
max{0, A−D}
Given the assumption of assets distributed as a Generalized Brownian Motion, the
application of the standard Black-Sholes option pricing formula yields the closed-form
expression of the Distance-to-Default indicator t periods ahead:
DDP =
ln
(
A
D
)
+
(
r − 12σ2A
)
t
σA
√
t
where r is the rate of growth of the company value (assets) and equals the risk-free interest
rate. σA is asset volatility.
In practice, implied asset value A and volatility σA are not observable and must be esti-
mated solving the following system of simultaneous equations by numerical methods:
E=AN(d1)− e−rtDN(d2)σE = AEσAN(d1)
where E is the value of equity, σE is the equity price return volatility. N(•) is the
cumulative normal distribution. The values of d1 and d2 are expressed as:
d1 =
ln (AD )+(r+
1
2
σ2A)t
σA
√
t
, d2 = d1 − σA
√
t
The calculation of DD in the literature uses market value as the value of equity E; his-
torical, GARCH-derived or option-implied volatilities as equity price return volatility σE ;
government bond yields as the risk-free interest rate r and the face value of short-term lia-
bilities plus half of that of long-term liabilities as the default barrier D. The time horizon
t is usually set at one year.
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Appendix B. Derivation of Portfolio Distance-to-Default
Aggregation of individual market-based and balance sheet data from N banks into a port-
folio DD is given by the following expression:
DDP =
ln
(
AP
DP
)
+
(
rP − 12σ2P
)
t
σP
√
t
where:
AP =
∑N
i=1Ai , is the total value of the portfolio’s assets (unobservable).
DP =
∑N
i=1Di , is the total value of the portfolio’s risky debt.
EP =
∑N
i=1Ei , is the equity market value of the portfolio.
rP =
∑N
i=1wiri , is the weighted average of risk-free rates.
wi =
Ei
EP
, or alternatively wi =
Ai
AP
is bank i’s weight in the portfolio.
σ2P =
∑N
i=1
∑N
j=1wiwjσij , is the portfolio’s asset variance (unobservable), where σij is
the asset return covariance of bank i and j.
After aggregating individual data and assuming the volatility structure of the portfolio,
calibration is conducted solving the system of equations from Appendix A. See Annett et al.
(2005), De Nicolo` and Tieman (2007), Echeverr´ıa et al. (2006), Echeverr´ıa et al. (2009a),
Gray and Malone (2008) and Vassalou and Xing (2004a) for applications.
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A Market-based Approach to
Sector Risk Determinants and
Transmission in the Euro Area
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4.1 Introduction
Due to the financial and economic crisis started in Summer 2007, research on financial
stability is facing new challenges and embarked on a growing agenda. There is a consen-
sus to develop new and enhanced measures to understand global financial networks and
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to provide policy making with improved analytic tools (Financial Stability Board, 2010).
The growing literature on financial stability has been urged to expand the focus and to in-
corporate the interaction between the financial system and the rest of the economic agents
and sectors.
This paper adresses the importance of heterogeneity in terms of risk determinants and
risk transmission across corporate sectors in the euro area. I propose a model where risk in
the corporate sector, comprising the financial sector (banks and insurance companies) and
the non-financial corporate sector, is determined by general economic and financial mar-
kets conditions and by sector-specific risk drivers. The first step in this paper consists in
generating forward-looking sector-level risk indicators based on Contingent Claims Anal-
ysis, a market-based indicator. Then, an analytic framework using Common Correlated
Effects (CCE) estimator from Pesaran (2006) is provided, allowing to study the diffusion
of risk across sectors and over time, in addition to those coming from other sector-specific
determinants and also from the macroeconomic environment and the financial markets.
A large amount of the emerging literature has focused mainly on the effects of macroe-
conomic shocks on banking stability, while some work also addresses vulnerabilities in
the corporate sector at aggregate level. These studies vary significantly in terms of the
empirical methods applied, the sectors and macroeconomic variables of study, and the
assumptions about the direction of shocks, but they all show this strong macro analytic
focus. As an example, De Graeve et al. (2008) develop a model of shocks and feedback
effects between the real sector (through monetary policy shocks) and the financial system
with no prior assumptions about the direction of shocks. On the same topic, Castre´n et al.
(2009) propose a model to assess effects from macroeconomic variables, with no feedback,
on credit risk measures of Large and Complex Banking Groups (LCBG) in the euro area.
Focusing on the interdependence between macro variables and the non-financial cor-
porate sector, A˚sberg and Shahnazarian (2009) use an error correction model to assess
sensitivity in the aggregate Swedish corporate sector to shocks in variables such as in-
dustrial production, interest rates and consumer prices. Carling et al. (2007) use a panel
data model to assess empirically the impact of macroeconomic and firm-specific shocks on
default probabilities also in the Swedish corporate sector. Bruneau et al. (2008) analyze
links in both directions between non-financial companies and macroeconomic variables,
including financial shocks, for the French economy. Castre´n et al. (2010) expand their pre-
vious work and study global macro and financial shocks on the same credit risk measures
of the euro area financial and corporate sectors separately, using satellite-GVAR mod-
els. Castre´n and Kavonius (2009) propose a different approach and they include in the
analysis the linkages among the rest of economic sectors, e.g. households, government and
rest of the world, using a network of balance sheet exposures and risk-based balance sheets.
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Even though the assessment of the effects of general economic conditions on overall
corporate risk is highly relevant for finacial stability, understanding also the credit risk
relationships within the corporate sector with a less macro focus is certainly not negli-
gible, yet it has not been extensively studied. As credit risk events at individual firm
level are linked via sector-specific and general economic conditions (Zhou, 2001), so is risk
propagation across corporate sectors through a number of complex channels. In addition,
sectoral risk features and responses to common shocks are heterogeneous, hence neglecting
this heterogeneity may be misleading in terms of overall credit risk management (Hanson
et al., 2008), financial stability analysis and policy decisions.
During the Asian crisis in 1997, an over-leveraged and poorly profitable corporate sec-
tor put the Asian financial system on the verge of collapse and triggered a deep economic
crisis (Pomerleano, 2007). The current crisis has highlighted the role of banks in hetero-
geneous risk transmission to the corporate sector in developed economies either directly
through credit constraints or indirectly through higher financing costs, less investment
counterparts or even second round effects on demand. Castre´n and Kavonius (2009) show
that the bilateral linkages between the financial system and the corporate sector in euro
area (measured by balance sheets gross exposures) are the most significative and take
place through both the credit channel and the securities markets. In addition, the degree
of correlation and default transmission between non-financial corporate sectors is high due
to complementary or similar business lines, e.g. Telecoms and Technology, Utilities and
Oil & Gas.
Sectoral risk relationships and their dynamics have previously been analyzed using
market-based indicators in Alves (2005) with a VAR approach and in Castre´n and Kavo-
nius (2009) using network analysis. Their results highlight important cross-dynamics
across sectors in addition to the impacts viewed as systemic and generated by macroe-
conomic variables. However, the high degree of aggregation in these papers are likely to
have neglected important linkages within the corporate sector and with the financial sys-
tem (Castre´n and Kavonius, 2009) and may also have ignored sector-specific elements of
default risk (Chava and Jarrow, 2004).
Additionally, the dimension limitations of a traditional VAR model leaves some unob-
served effects unaccounted for (Alves, 2005). In a very recent paper, Bernoth and Pick
(2011) model linkages between the insurance and banking sectors and forecast their de-
fault risk in presence of unobserved linkages and other common shocks using the CCE
estimator1. The determinants of default risk are presented and discussed as subproducts,
since the paper focus are mainly forecasting techniques, hence the authors do not tackle
the issue of risk transmission between the financials and the non-financial corporate sector,
1The authors use backward-looking Distance-to-Default series computed for a very large number of
individual institutions and aggregate them into simple average series to compute systemic wide forcasts.
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potentially overlooking an important source of risk in their sample.
For these reasons, this paper exploits recent techniques to deal with panel data in
presence of cross-section dependence (CD) and unobserved factors using the Common Cor-
related Effects (CCE) estimator introduced in Pesaran (2006). This study generates the
following contributions to the literature. First, it proposes a methodology to build sectoral
risk indicators using balance sheet, market-based and, most notably, option prices infor-
mation. These series become forward-looking and allow for a wide range of stress-testing
execises. Then, the paper provides an analytic framework to study risk determinants and
transmission at sector level in the euro area by taking into account both the cross-section
dimension as well as the time series dimension of risk, which has been long neglected in
the literature due to lack of a suitable multivariate methodology.
The results show that aggregate corporate default risk comprises a stationary idiosyn-
cratic factor and a non-stationary common element that drives the deviations of the for-
mer from a long-term steady state. Results of the econometric model show that shocks
originated in the macroeconomic and financial environment have limited relevance on id-
iosyncratic sectoral risk when cross-section dependence is accounted for and the common
element is filtered out. This result is partly driven by the market-base nature of the risk
indicator under analysis and more importantly because sectoral risk responds more signif-
icantly to sector-specific shocks, including proximity-driven risk spill-overs. Results also
reveal a high degree of heterogeneity in terms of sensitivity and direction of the effects
both from macro-financial variables and from sector-specific risk-drivers. These results
show that a macro-only focus of the analysis of financial stability would be misleading for
policy if cross-section dependence and sectoral heterogeneity is ignored.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the sector-level
risk indicator and the methodology to compute it for aggregate sectors. Section 4.3 de-
scribes the sample of sectors and companies included in the analysis and the properties of
the sectoral risk indicators. Section 4.4 describes the analytic framework of risk determi-
nants and diffusion using the CCE estimator and other panel data methods applied in the
empirical analysis. The results of the former are explained in Section 4.5 and Section 4.6
concludes.
4.2 Sectoral Risk Measure for the Euro Area’s Financial and
Corporate Sectors
The risk measures chosen in this paper to analyze sector-level stress in the euro area are
Portfolio Distance-to-Default (DD) series, namely forward-looking DD series built using
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aggregated information of individual companies by sector. DD series make part of the set
of risk indicators based on Contingent Claims Analysis (CCA)2. DD series were initially
developed and disseminated for commercial purposes by Moody’s KMV using market-
based and balance sheet information to assess credit risk in individual companies (Crosbie
and Bohn, 2003; Arora and Sellers, 2004).
They indicate the number of standard deviations at which the market value of assets
is away from a default barrier defined by a given liabilities structure. A decrease in DD
reflects a deteriorating risk profile, as a result of the combination of the following factors:
lower expected profitability, weakening capitalization and/or incresing asset volatility (An-
nett et al., 2005; De Nicolo` and Tieman, 2007). Variants of this indicator are increasingly
used to analyze credit risk of aggregated corporate and macro sectors. Gray and Malone
(2008) provide a comprehensive overview of techniques and applications.
At aggregate corporate sector-level exclusively, DD signals the probability of gener-
alized distress or joint failure in a given sector or industry. Despite strong modelling
assumptions3, empirical research has shown that aggregate DD dynamics contain infor-
mational signals of market valuation of distress and therefore DD is a valuable monitoring
tool of the risk profile in the financial and non-financial corporate sectors (Gropp et al.,
2009; Vassalou and Xing, 2004b).
Since the same principles of CCA can be applied to aggregation of firms, the analysis
of an entire corporate sector becomes the analysis of a portfolio of companies. In empiri-
cal terms, individual company information needs to be aggregated together into a single,
tractable and highly representative indicator by corporate sector, where its composition
must be clearly defined.
As for aggregation, most papers in the literature compute the median or either the
weighted or unweighted average of DD or EDF series4 for a large and changing sample
of companies. This methodology produces an indicator that highlights the overall risk
outlook in the sector but may overemphasize the large players or may partially neglect
interdependencies among portfolio constituents (Alves, 2005). Examples of this approach
are found in Alves (2005); Bernoth and Pick (2011); Carlson et al. (2008); Castre´n and
2Contingent Claims Analysis (CCA) is an analytic framework whereby a comprehensive set of financial
risk indicators is obtained by combining balance sheet and market-based information including expected
loss, probability of distress, expected recovery rate and credit spread over the benchmark risk-free interest
rate. It is based on the Black-Scholes-Merton model of option pricing and has three principles: 1) The
economic value of liabilities is derived and equals the economic value of assets, where liabilities equals
debt plus equity; 2) Liabilities in the balance sheet have different priorities and risk; and 3) The assets
distribution follows a stochastic process.
3These assumptions are concerned mainly with those inherent in the Merton-based model (e.g. lognor-
mal distribution of assets) and also the liability structure.
4Expected Default Frequency (EDF) is a credit measure based on CCA and adapted by Moody’s KMV
to reflect actual default distributions.
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Kavonius (2009); Castre´n et al. (2009, 2010) and A˚sberg and Shahnazarian (2009).
By contrast, this paper’s aggregation approach are Portfolio DD series, following re-
search on financial systemic risk in Cˇiha´k and Koeva Brooks (2009b); De Nicolo` and
Tieman (2007); Mu¨hleisen et al. (2006); Echeverr´ıa et al. (2009b); Annett et al. (2005)
and Sald´ıas (2010). This methodology treats the set of companies by sector as a single en-
tity, it aggregates balance sheet and market data and incorporates the assumed portofolio
volatility before computing the DD series. Appendix A contains a complete explanation
of Portfolio DD’s derivation and data requirements.
The Portfolio DD series obtained using this methodology have several interesting fea-
tures. Portfolio DD enhances the informational properties of average DD series, since it
does not only capture company size but also interdependencies among the portfolio con-
stituents. It may be considered the upper bound of joint distance to distress (the lower
bound in terms of joint probabilities of distress) in normal times (De Nicolo` and Tieman,
2007) but it tends to converge with the average DD in times of stress, when equity market
volatility is higher. This feature illustrates quick reaction of the indicator to market events
and shows the generalized increase in returns correlation in a sector during distress times,
even if fundamentals of portolio constituents may be solid (Sald´ıas, 2010). Aggregated
company fundamentals embdedded in the indicator are informative of longer-term trends
of sectoral risk.
Finally, since aggregation of company information is conducted before computing the
risk indicator, calibration of Portfolio DD also allows to add more easily forward-looking
properties from option markets via option implied volatilities from EURO STOXX indices,
which also circumvent assumptions about constituents’ returns correlations. Portfolio DD
acquires more responsiveness to early signs of sector-level distress and hence serves to
stress scenarios5.
The second empirical issue deals with the sector classification and the selection of con-
stituent companies in the Portfolio DD. Research based on median and average DD series
tackles only the former issue6 and then picks the largest sample available with breaks in
sample composition. This approach is however likely to be affected by spurious variation
due to classification changes affecting large companies (Alves, 2005) or due to relevant
corporate events, including M&A, spin-offs or delistings.
This paper choice for sector classification is the Industry Classification Benchmark
5This paper does not include average DD series computed using option price information as described
in Sald´ıas (2010) since there are not enough single equity options traded for all companies in this large
sample.
6In general, they adopt systems linked to those used for National Accounting.
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(ICB) at Supersector level7. ICB is a widely used and comprehensive company classi-
fication system jointly developed by FTSE & Dow Jones Indexes to aggregate traded
companies according to their main sources of revenue, as reported in audited accounts
and directors’ reports. The grouping at Supersector level is wide enough to ensure a large
degree of homogeneity in business models and sectoral characteristics in each portfolio
and it is narrow enough not to blur interactions among them. An additional yet very
important reason for this grouping criterion is the fact that Portfolio DD are built so they
include option-based information and the most liquid option market for sector indices are
the EURO STOXX options on ICB-based Supersectors traded at Eurex.
Constituent lists in each Supersector Index are revised every quarter and reclassifica-
tions take place whenever relevant corporate events occur. In order to minimize possible
spurious variation in the risk indicator, the portfolio constituents take into account these
changes and make some assumptions when required. Appendices B and C describe in
detail the company sample by portfolio and all additional assumptions made to ensure the
portfolios’ accuracy, including exclusions and ad-hoc reclassifications.
4.3 Sample and Preliminary Analysis
The sample consists of 12 out of the 19 EURO STOXX Supersectors. These sectors are the
most relevant by different measures of size, e.g. assets, market value, employment. They
have been chosen according to two main criteria in order to ensure the best informative
quality of their market-based indicators, namely: 1) availability and liquid trading volume
of their associated Eurex Index options quotes8; and 2) stock market capitalization of the
their corresponding Supersector STOXX Indices at Deutsche Boerse. Table 10 briefly lists
them and provides relevant market information.
[Insert Table 10 here]
The dataset comprises monthly observations between December 2001 and October
2009 (95 observations by Supersector). This period is characterized by an increasing
degree of integration in European financial markets due to the introduction of the euro
and a greater europeanization of corporate activities (Ve´ron, 2006). Recent trends and
findings suggest that equity markets integration has lead to a reduction of home bias and
to an increase of sector-based equity allocation strategies at the expense of country-based
strategies (European Central Bank, 2010; Cappiello et al., 2010). These developments
give support to the aggregation of company risk indicators into portfolios for the euro area
7Even though Industries, Supersectors and Sectors are clearly differentiated as ICB Categories, the use
of these terms in this paper will uniquely refer to Supersectors.
8The DD series were initally computed on a daily basis and then averaged to obtain monthly data.
Volatilities from a GARCH(1,1) model applied to the respective Supersector index were used to complete
the volatilities series when unavailable.
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as a whole and they provide a first temptative and equity-driven explanation to strong
comovement of the series over time, as can be seen in Figure 13.
[Insert Figure 13 here]
Figure 13 displays together the 12 sectoral DD series and the EURO STOXX 50,
the benchmark stock index in the euro area. Being a market-based indicator, DD se-
ries move along together with the stock market benchmark. In fact, they visibly lead
it. This feature serves to illustrate the forward-looking properties of the DD series from
option prices as inputs (Sald´ıas, 2010). The DD series anticipate turning points along
the entire period of analysis. During the recent crisis, they reach their bottom at the end
of 2008 while the EURO STOXX 50 only picks up after the end of the first quarter of 2009.
[Insert Figures 14 and 15 here]
The DD series do not show a clear linear trend but they suggest a high degree of co-
movement along the whole time span and correlation among them is very high on average
and statistically significant both in levels and in first differences. Figures 14 and 15 show
the median and quartile regions of bilateral correlation coefficients across sectors using 24-
month moving windows of DD series levels and first differences in order to illustrate the
changing patttern of cross-section sectoral risk correlation over time. Median correlation
is high in the entire sample but it shows greater dispersion in tranquil times where id-
iosyncratic drivers of sector risk dominate. However, median correlation increases and its
dispersion across sectors narrows significantly in episodes of higher stress in financial mar-
kets, e.g. in the aftermath of the dot-com bubble burst in 2002; after the subprime crisis
start in August 2007; and especially in the third quarter of 2008, after Lehman Brothers’
collapse. At the end of the sample, median risk correlation across sectors remains high,
but there is greater dispersion suggesting somehow a moderation in the role of sector-wide
risk drivers.
Table 11 reports preliminary cross-section dependence tests applied to levels and first
differences of DD series regressed on sector intercepts. High values of all these statistics
reject the null hypothesis of cross-section independence and confirm the results of graphi-
cal inspection: DD series show a high degree of cross-section dependence even if the series
are differentiated.
[Insert Table 11 here]
Strong comovement and high correlation among the series suggests first that both ob-
servable and unobservable factors must be at place. Variables from the macroeconomic
44
environment and from financial markets are strong candidates as common factors and in-
duce strong cross-section dependence across sectors (Alves, 2005; Holly et al., 2010).
Additionally, this particular dynamics in DD series may also be caused by risk difussion
across sectors, which in turn may come in form of “economic proximity” and additional
unobserved factors. Risk transmission is likely to be variant across sectors and change in
time and the nature of sectoral economic proximity comes from many sources. Similar-
ity of business lines is a first source of this type of relationship and it includes common
customer base and competition relationships. Financial linkages are another source of
shock spillovers and take place not only between the financial sector and the non-financial
corporates, but also between non-financial companies through credit chains and counter-
party risk relationships. See results in Couderc et al. (2008); Das et al. (2007); Jarrow
and Yu (2001) and Veldkamp and Wolfers (2007) for in depth discussions of these rela-
tionships9. Finally, other complementarity relationships are also relevant. They can take
place through technological linkages (Raddatz, 2010) or collateral channels of risk through
the securities channel (Benmelech and Bergman, 2011).
4.4 The Econometric Model
This section describes in detail the econometric model to analyze the risk determinants
and transmission across the euro area’s financial and corporate sectors using the Portfolio
Distance-to-Default series constructed following the methodology presented in Section 4.2
and Appendix A. It also summarizes additional cross-section dependence and panel unit
root tests used in the model specification and inference.
Under the potential presence of cross-section dependence in the DD series, a suitable
econometric method is the Common Correlated Effects (CCE) estimator introduced in
Pesaran (2006). CCE is a consistent econometric panel data method in presence of dif-
ferent degrees of cross-section dependence coming from common observed and single or
multiple unobserved factors and from proximity-driven spillover effects. The CCE method
also tackles methodological limitations of other econometric models when modeling inter-
relationships across sectors due to large N dimension, e.g. VAR (Pesaran et al., 2004).
This method is computationally simple and has satisfactory small sample properties
even under a substantial degree of heterogeneity and dynamics, and for relatively small
time-series and cross-section dimensions (N = 12 and T = 95 in this case). It is also consis-
9Bernoth and Pick (2011) also explore spatial effects in risk diffusion between banking and insurance
sectors using DD series of individual institutions from Asia, North America and Europe. In this paper,
the spatial component is not relevant since portfolios are constructed bundling together only euro area
companies.
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tent in presence of stationary and non-stationary unobserved common factors (Kapetanios
et al., 2011) and more suitable for this dataset than a SURE model due to the possible
presence of time-variant correlation patterns, as suggested for this case in Figures 14 and
15.
The general model specification is a dynamic panel and takes the following form:
DDi,t = αidt + βiXi,t + ui,t, i = 1, . . . , N ; t = 1, . . . , T (4.1)
where DDi,t is the Distance-to-Default of sector i at time t. The vector dt includes the
intercepts and a set of common observed factors that capture common macroeconomic and
systemic market shocks. Xi,t is the vector of sector-specific regressors, including lags of i’s
own Distance-to-Default, the direct risk spill-overs from “neighbouring sectors” and other
sector-specific variables. All coefficients are allowed to be heterogeneous across sectors10
and all remaining factors omitted in the specification and other idiosyncratic risk drivers
are captured in the error term ui,t.
The CCE estimator can be computed by OLS applied to sector-individual regressions
where the observed regressors are augmented with cross-sectional averages of the depen-
dent variable and the individual-specific regressors. The CCE estimator provides two
versions, namely the CCE Pooled estimator (CCEP) and the CCE Mean Group estima-
tor, of which only the latter will be reported because of slope heterogeneity and no need
for CCEP efficiency gains in this case.
4.4.1 Macroeconomic and Financial Risk Determinants
A set of five exogeneous variables is included in the model in order to control for de-
terminants originated in the macroeconomic environment and to capture risk sensitivity
to common shocks in financial markets. A number of papers quoted in Section 4.1 have
documented the explanatory power of macroeconomic and financial variables in corporate
default risk, thus their omission could bias the results of the parameter estimation in the
model. In addition, CCE literature suggests that common shocks tend to be one of the
main sources of strong cross-section dependence.
The model takes macrofinancial determinants as exogeneous and chooses to ignore pos-
sible feedback effects to the macrofinancial environment. Examples of this approach and
additional explanation for this modeling decision can be found in Castre´n et al. (2010) and
Castre´n et al. (2009). Accordingly, the econometric specification first includes the annual
rate of change of the Industrial Production Index (∆PIt) and the Harmonised Index of
10See for instance results in Castre´n et al. (2010) for a more detailed, yet not strictly comparable, dis-
cussion of heterogeneous impact of macro variables on corporate sectors, which are defined using European
national accounting (NACE) methodology.
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Consumer Prices (∆CPt) in the euro area, in order to capture the effect of demand shocks.
Brent Oil (1-Month Forward Contract) prices changes denominated in euro (OILt) detect
supply shocks. The short-term benchmark interest rate is also included using the 3-Month
Euribor Rate (R3Mt), which also reflects developments in the money market affecting the
financial sector and serves as a reference for corporate debt yields and borrowing. They
also are linked to corporate asset return growth Finally, the Chicago Board Options Ex-
change Volatility Index (V IXt) is included to gauge global equity market sentiment. The
VIX index tends to be low when markets are on an upward trend and tend to increase with
market pessimism, therefore it’s relationship with DD series is expected to be negative.
4.4.2 Sector-specific Risk Determinants
Sector-specific Risk Determinants
The model includes two other sector-specific regressors computed for each ICB Supersector
Index11, namely the annual rate of change of the Price-Earnings Ratio, ∆PEt, and the
annual rate of change in Dividend Yields, ∆DYt.
Earnings are studied extensively in the corporate bankruptcy literature. Indeed, re-
sults in Shumway (2001); Beaver et al. (2005) and Chava and Jarrow (2004) show that
higher earnings are traditionally associated with lower distress probabilities, in spite of
a weaker informational ability detected in recent years due to higher frequency in earn-
ings restatements and the possibility of data manipulation (Dechow and Schrand, 2004).
Dividends traditionally serve to assess and infer corporate performance. Recent work by
Charitou et al. (2010) shows that dividend payment initiations or increases tend to re-
duce corporate default and tend to raise the assets returns for several subsequent periods.
However, specially in the financial sector, aggressive dividend policies may also encourage
risk-taking and erode the capital base of a company or sector (Acharya et al., 2011).
No additional firm-level information or sector specific indicator are included in the
model since the DD construction already includes either directly or indirectly the most
relevant variables of sector risk, i.e. market-implied assets’ returns and volatility and
aggregated leverage (Bernoth and Pick, 2011; Gropp et al., 2004b).
Neighbouring Sectors’ Risk Spillovers
The risk spill-over across sectors is studied using DD series from neighbouring sectors.
For a given sector i, the neighbouring effect is defined by:
DD
ni
i,t =
1
ni
n∑
j=1
DDj,t (4.2)
11See Appendix D for details of these determinants and the rest of macro-financial variables.
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DD
n
i,t is a simple average of the DD series of the n “neighbours” (DDj,t) of sector i.
For earch sector i, the number of neighbours and weighting of their corresponding
DD series are determined by a contiguity matrix (see Table 12) derived from ad-hoc and
predefined neighbourhood linkages among sectors12. Even though the definition of neigh-
bouring sectors and cross-sectional dependence in the literature comes largely from spatial
proximity (Holly et al., 2011, 2010; Pesaran and Tosetti, 2011; Chudik et al., 2010), other
measures of proximity, from economic or social networks, are also used in recent research
(Conley and Topa, 2002; Conley and Dupor, 2003; Holly and Petrella, 2010).
In the case of corporate sectors, the literature does not provide a definite metric to de-
termine neighbourhood linkages, because sectoral relationships depend both on the choice
of sector classification and on the sectoral characteristics to be linked13. Pesaran et al.
(2004) argue that the aggregation error in this type of exercises can be minimized if the
cross-section units, i.e. sectors in this case, are similar and the weights are chosen carefully.
As a result, the approach in this model is ad-hoc and market-based. It relies on
similarity of business lines embedded in the ICB methodology and covers important and
ovelapping dimensions of sectoral interdependences, namely: balance-sheet exposures, fi-
nancial linkages, common accounting practices, technological linkages, etc.
Supersectors are first assumed to be neighbours if they belong to the same Industry,
an upper level of aggregation to Supersectors in the ICB methodology structure. For in-
stance, the Industry of Consumer Goods links the Supersectors of Automobiles & Parts
and Foods & Beverages while Banks and Insurance Supesectors are bundled together as
Financials.
The second proximity criterion used to aggregate series into neighbours is also based
on the ICB methodology but it relies on the most frequent company reclassifications across
Supersectors within or outside a given Industry during the time span used in the paper.
Under multiple business lines, company reclassifications take place mainly due to changes
in the main business line and also due to corporate actions such as spin-offs or M&A.
12The contiguity matrix W is an N ×N nonnegative matrix, whose wi,j element is 1 if sectors i and j
are considered neighbours and 0 otherwise. The number of neighbours for sector i is the sum of elements
along row i. Although weighting criteria is not likely to affect the properties of the econometric approach
(Chudik et al., 2010) and a valid alternative in this case could weigh DD series by implied assets from
the calibration, this paper assumes equal weights in the neighborhood average (1/n) because the nature of
the business in each sector affects considerably the asset sizes, hence, asset-based weights could introduce
distortion. In addition, there is no only and unambiguous way to determine relative importance of sectors
among each other.
13Most studies deal with manufacturing sectors data, excluding financials. For example, Conley and
Dupor (2003) study sectoral synchronization of output and productivity growth using factor demand
linkages as a metric for economic distance for US corporates and define the sectors of study using the SIC
system. Holly and Petrella (2010) use input-output linkages and analyze the shock propagation across
manufacturing sectors.
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Examples of this were frequent in supersectors such as Industrial Goods & Services, Oil
& Gas and Utilities, which do not belong to the same ICB Industries.
[Insert Table 12 here]
4.4.3 Cross-section Dependence Tests
This section makes a brief review of the three statistics of cross-section dependence (CD)
in panel data used in the paper for model specification and inference. All of them are
based on pairwise correlation coefficients, ρij , of regressions’ residuals
14. The average of
cross-correlation coefficients, ρ¯, is applied to provide a first assessment at a descriptive
level.
ρ¯ =
1
N(N − 1)
N−1∑
i=1
N−1∑
j=i+1
ρij (4.3)
The second statistic is the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) CD test proposed by Breusch and
Pagan (1980), CDLM , in the context of seemingly unrelated regression equation (SURE)
framework with N fixed and T large (T →∞). Under the null hypothesis of no CD (and
the assumption of no serial correlation of the residuals), the CDLM statistic takes the
following form and distribution:
CDLM = T
N−1∑
i=1
N∑
j=i+1
ρ2ij
d→ χ2N(N−1)/2 (4.4)
Finally, the third statistic is the Pesaran (2004) CD statistic, CDP , developed for cases
where the N dimension becomes larger and the CDLM tends to suffer from size distorsions
and bias. It is a test for panels where series may be eithe stationary or contain unit roots.
This statistic takes the following form and distribution.
CDP =
√
2T
N(N − 1)
N−1∑
i=1
N∑
j=i+1
ρij
d→ N(0, 1) (4.5)
This CD statistic shows good properties with dynamic panels but has also a ceveat.
Since it involves the sum of pairwise correlation coefficients instead of the sum of squared
correlations, the CDP statistic might miss out CD where there are alternating signs of
correlations in the residuals. For this reason, these three CD statistics are reported with
the preliminary analysis and estimation results.
14ρij = ρji =
∑T
t=1 uˆituˆjt√∑T
t=1 uˆ
2
it
√∑T
t=1 uˆ
2
jt
, where uˆit and uˆjt are residuals from equation (4.1) or individual
series’ ADF(p) or cross-sectionally augmented ADF(p) regressions, CADF(p).
49
4.4.4 Unit Root Tests
In addition to the IPS test proposed by Im et al. (2003), cross-sectionally augmented IPS
test (CIPS) from Pesaran (2007) are applied to test for unit roots in the dataset and
hence to ensure a correct model specification. This test also allows for individual unit root
processes and for different serial correlation properties across units. It is more suitable in
the presence of cross-section dependence in the series, since the traditional IPS may lead
to spurious inference.
The CIPS test statistic is computed using the average of the individual pth order
cross-sectionally Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) regressions’ statistics (CADF). The test
assumes a single unobserved common factor, but is robust to other potential sources of
cross-section dependence, such as spill-over effects (Baltagi et al., 2007). This assumed
factor structure is accounted for by adding the averages of lagged levels and first-differences
of the dependent variable to each standard ADF regression.
∆yi,t = ai + biyi,t−1 +
pi∑
l=1
ci,l∆yi,t−l + d′iz¯t + νi,t, i = 1, . . . , N ; t = 1, . . . , T (4.6)
where z¯t = (y¯t−1,∆y¯t,∆y¯t−1, . . . ,∆y¯t−p)′. Under the null hypothesis of non-stationarity
against the possibly heterogeneous presence of unit roots across i, the CIPS statistic takes
the following form.
CIPS =
1
N
N∑
i=1
t˜i (4.7)
where t˜i is the t-statistic associated to bˆi in CADF equations. The joint asymptotic
limit of the CIPS statistic is nonstandard and critical values can be found in Pesaran
(2007) for various numbers of cross-section units N and time series lengths T .
.
4.5 Empirical Results
4.5.1 Cross-section Dependence and Non-stationarity Analysis
Preliminary analysis in Section 4.3 detected a high degree of comovement in DD series
in levels and first differences. This section takes a step further and extends the CD tests
to the rest of sector-specific variables in the panel allowing for different degrees of serial
correlation in the data. It also conducts stationarity analysis of the data for correct model
specification, taking into account the potential presence of CD.
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Table 13 reports CD statistics of residuals from ADF(p) regressions of the DD series
and the sector-specific variables, namely Dividend Yields growth (∆DYi,t), Price-Earnings
ratio growth (∆PEi,t) and the neighbouring sectors’ DD series (DD
n
i,t). The regressions
are run without cross-section augmentations for lag orders p = 0, . . . , 6 over the whole
sample. Results are robust to the lag order choice p and detect that DD series and the
DD
n
i,t present very high and positive average correlation coefficients, above 60%, whereas
correlation for dividend yields’ growth area also large but in the range of 30% - 40%.
Price-Earnings ratio growth show very low correlation across sectors, with a coefficient
of around 3%. CD test statistics, reported below, are in line with these results and are
highest for DD series and neighbouring effects, and smaller yet significant for the rest of
the variables. These tests confirm the high cross-section dependence in the data, with
arguably the exception of Price-Earnings ratio growth.
[Insert Table 13 here]
In line of the results of CD tests, panel unit root tests for the DD series and the sector-
specific regressors need to take into account the cross-dependence. Accordingly, Table 14
summarizes the CIPS panel unit root tests introduced in Section 4.4.4. IPS test statistics
are also reported for robustness check and comparison. Both CIPS and IPS tests reject
unit roots in dividend yields’ growth and Price-Earnings ratio growth. Interestingly, the
CIPS strongly reject unit roots in the case of DD series and neighbouring effects for all lag
orders p, whereas IPS tests seem to suggest non-stationarity in most cases tested. Given
the substantial degree of cross-section dependence detected in these series, the CIPS tests
provide a more reliable inference and these variables are also taken as I(0).
[Insert Table 14 here]
However, it is relevant to check for the robustness of these panel unit root results and
to explore the source of non-stationarity in the DD and in neighbouring-DD series when
CD is omitted. Table 15 reports CIPS test statistics for different orders of serial correlation
were one Supersector at a time is removed from the panel. Results are similar to those
presented in Table 14 and indicate also that non-stationarity in DDi,t and DD
n
i,t series
must be rejected.
[Insert Table 15 here]
Given these results, the non-stationarity detected using IPS tests may likely come
from the combination of non-stationary common factors and stationary idiosyncratic com-
ponents in DD series and DD-neighbouring effects. This possibility is checked this by
adopting the Panel Analysis of Nonstationarity in the Idiosyncratic and Common compo-
nents or PANIC approach advanced by Bai and Ng (2004). First, the common factors can
be well approximated by the cross-section averages of the series (DDt, DD
n
t ), under the
CCE model assumptions detailed in Section 4.4. Idiosyncratic components are obtained
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from the residuals from the OLS regressions of the individual series DDit and DD
n
i,t,
i = 1, . . . , 12, on these cross-section averages. Then, unit root tests for these series are
conducted using individual ADF unit root tests for the cross-section averages (common
components) and IPS tests for the residuals (idiosyncratic components). Results of these
tests are displayed in Table 16 and confirm that non-stationarity in the series is indeed
due to the common factor while the idiosyncratic sectoral risk components are stationary.
This result is consistent with findings in Alves (2005), and provides empirical support to
the notion that aggregate sectoral risk evolves to a long-run equilibrium, which is in turn
affected temporarily by the macro-financial enviroment and the cross-sectoral dynamics
captured by the CCE method.
[Insert Table 16 here]
Finally, individual ADF(p) unit root tests were run for the macro-financial variables
described in Section 4.4.1 which enter the model as exogeneous regressors. Based on the
results of these tests reported in Table 17, the annual rates of change of the Industrial
Production Index (∆PIt) and the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (∆CPt) enter the
model as I(0) variables, while Brent Oil prices (OILt), the 3-Month Euribor Rate (R3Mt)
and the VIX Volatility Index (V IXt) are previously differentiated to enter the model.
[Insert Table 17 here]
4.5.2 Model Estimation
The results from estimation of Equation (4.1) are reported in Table 18. Columns [1]
to [3] are estimates of na¨ıve OLS Mean Group (MG) models that neglect cross-section
dependence (CD) induced by unobserved common factors. Columns [4] to [6] are Common
Correlated Effects (CCE) estimates of these same specifications, hence more consistent
given the data properties analyzed in the previous section. Although MG estimates are
likely to be biased, they serve as a benchmark for the CCE estimates and also put into
context the relevance of CD in the model specification. They also serve to compare these
results with previous studies on determinants of aggregate sectoral risk.
[Insert Table 18 here]
The first result worth mentioning is the limited relevance, overall, of shocks originated
in the macroeconomic and financial environment on DD, specially when CD is accounted
for. Sorge and Virolainen (2006) tackled this issue and found that marked-based indi-
cators, such as DD, are less responsive due to non-linearities in their interactions with
macroeconomic and financial variables. Additionally, the authors suggest that business
cycle volatility has been smoothed out in the construction of DD series or other CCA
risk measures (specially EDF). Macro-financial effects may impact sectoral DD in a more
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indirect way, via market news already embedded in the DD inputs and/or through cross-
dynamics transmitting risk across industries (Alves, 2005).
In paticular, the VIX Volatility Index (V IXt), a measure of investors’ risk sentiment,
is statistically significant at five percent across all the MG estimates and shows a stable
and expected negative sign, indicating an increase in sector-wide risk, i.e. a drop in DD,
when equity markets become more volatile. However, in all models estimated using the
CCE method, [4] to [6], its effect on overall sectoral risk tends to vanish. This is not a
surprising result, as Bernoth and Pick (2011) report that the VIX Index is absent in their
CCE-based models when forecasting DD at firm-level for banks and insurance companies.
A plausible explanation in this case is that option implied volatilities from index options
endow the sectoral DD with the forward-looking information embedded in the VIX Index.
The same holds true for the 3-month Money Market (Euribor) Rate, R3Mt, which
shows statistical significance at five percent level and a positive and stable coefficient only
if CD is ignored. The effect of short-term interest rates on sectoral risk was expected to be
negative if we consider them as a proxy of borrowing costs and risk premia. However, since
short-term interest rates are closely linked to the risk-free rate used to capture sectoral
assets return growth in the DD computation via the yield curve, this feature is likely to
be dominant in the estimates in this case. In addition, several empirical studies link the
short-term interest rates to higher performance and make an empirical case for the positive
sign. This positive effect (0.6) becomes nil when CD is included, probably because the
unobserved common factors capture it. This result is at odds with findings in A˚sberg and
Shahnazarian (2009)15, where the authors use a single risk indicator for the whole corpo-
rate sector, but consistent with those from Castre´n et al. (2010), where short-term interest
rates are in general insignificant across several corporate sectors studied individually.
Shocks from oil prices (OILt) and industrial production growth (PIt) are insignificant
on DD even when CD is negleted, whereas growth in consumer prices (CPt) affects nega-
tively, as expected, on overall sectoral risk in only one of the MG specifications, equation
[1]. This impact becomes insignificant when more regressors are included in the model
and in all cases when CD is controlled for. As for the statistical insignificance of the first
two variables, this result is somehow surprising but not entirely inconsistent with previ-
ous findings in the empirical literature. For instance, Alves (2005) finds that oil prices
do not affect but one of the seven sectors he includes in his study, whereas the effects of
inflation are likely to be captured either by the unobserved common effects or the set of
sector-specific variables more accurately. Bernoth and Pick (2011) find a positive effect on
15In this paper, the authors analyze effects of macroeconomic shocks on the the median EDF of the
whole corporate sector in Sweden in a cointegrated VAR model. This series is a I(1) variable, in line with
the findings described in the stationarity analysis of this paper, but this analysis does not take into account
the heterogeneity across sectors and the cross-section dependence is ignored.
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inflation on DD series of banks and negative one on insurance companies.
Sector-specific regressors on DD show much better results in terms of statistical sig-
nificance under CD, which challenges the macro dominant focus in the existing literature
of financial stability and highlights the importance of sector-level information and in-
teractions for policy analysis of systemic risk. In particular, dividend yields’ growth by
Supersector (∆DYi,t) do not have statistical significance when CD is omitted but exert
a significant yet surprisingly negative effect on DD when CD is taken into account. The
opposite sign was expected, but this result is not entirely in conflict with previous findings
using this method, since Bernoth and Pick (2011) report also that the impact of dividends’
growth may vary across sectors, being negative for the insurance sector and positive for
banks. One possible theoretical explanation is the positive link between risk taking and
aggressive dividend policies across companies and sectors (Acharya et al., 2011). The
Price-Earnings Ratio, ∆PEt, shows an expected positive sign in equation [3], significant
at 10% level, but becomes insignificant when the CCE method is applied, in line with
findings in Bernoth and Pick (2011).
The lag of the dependent variable, DDi,t−1, shows a large and significant positive
coefficient regardless the estimation method. The CCE estimates show however smaller
coefficients as additional regressors are included in the specifications. This MG coefficients
are larger, close to one, probably because MG estimates capture also the non-stationary
common components. The strong significance of this regressor confirms results in the liter-
ature (Alves, 2005; Bernoth and Pick, 2011) and illustrate the persistence in idiosyncratic
sectoral risk even after controlling for CD.
Finally, the neighbouring sectors’ risk lagged effect on DD16, DD
n
i,t−1, is statistically
insignifficant in the CCE-estimated models, overall, while MG estimates do exhibit the ex-
pected positive coefficient (0.123). This result implies that the risk impact in sectors with
strong linkages on other sectors does not work directly but is mainly captured as unob-
served common factor. It may also be possible that the ad-hoc definition of neighbouring
sectors is not sufficiently accurate and other sectoral dimensions than those described in
Section 4.4.2 need to be explored to obtain a more reliable contiguity matrix.
Some of the overall results described so far are expected to vary across sectors due to
heterogeneous effects of the regressors and also possibly because unobserved cross-sectoral
and complex shocks alter the relationships with them. As the CCE modelling approach
allows to shed some light on this, Table 19 reports the results of model [6] at individual
sector-level. To recap, this model is the most comprehensive and includes all variables
described in Section 4.4. Its overall estimates showed that none of the macroeconomic or
16Contemporary effects were not gauged do the risk of dealing with potential strong endogeneity and
limited possibilities to find valid instruments for this regressor.
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financial variables is statistically significant. Only the lag of DD (0.591) and the growth in
dividend yields, with a negative sign (-0.002), are the main drivers of idiosyncratic sectoral
risk, after controlling for cross-section dependence.
[Insert Table 19 here]
However, at individual Supersector level, macro-financial variables do affect DD in
some Supersectors and with not necessarily the same sign. For instance, oil prices (OILt)
do exert a statistically significant impact on the Insurance (INS) supersector (-0.015) and,
as expected, a positive effect on the Oil & Gas (ENE) supersector (0.022), which is linked
to the nature of its business line and performance. Interest rates (R3Mt) do play a signif-
icant role as proxy of borrowing costs and risk premia for the Media (MDI) supersector
(-0.550), while the VIX Index (V IXt) has a surprisingly positive effect on the idiosyncratic
component of risk in the Industrial Goods & Services supersector (0.026), which is in turn
the only Supersector where the lag of DD is irrelevant. Industrial production growth and
consumer prices inflation stand out as the only macroeconomic variables that fail to show
also at individual level any effect on sectoral risk.
As for the sector-specific variables, dividend yields growth, ∆DYt, and Price-Earnings
Ratio growth, ∆PEt, affect also heterogeneously across Supersectors. The coefficients as-
sociated to dividend yields are significant and surprisingly positive in the Telecommunica-
tions and Media sector, in contrast to the negative significant sign overall. Price-Earnings
Ratio growth affect only the Food & Beverages sector with an expected positive sign but
is also irrelevant for the rest of Supersectors.
Mirroring aggregated results, the lag of the dependent variable, DDi,t−1, is highly sig-
nificant also at individual level, for all supersectors with the only exception of the Industral
Goods & Services sector. Finally, the lagged neighbouring risk effect, non-significant over-
all, is a risk driver in two Supersectors, Industral Goods & Services and Media, but with
a negative and positive signs, respectively. The divergence in signs are informative of the
nature of relationships of these sectors with their neighbours, as defined by the contiguity
matrix constructed in this study.
As might be expected, the cross-section dependence test statistics at the bottom of
Table 18 display a remarkable decline when the CCE estimator is applied and there is no
significant evidence of remaining CD in the estimation residuals. It is however noticeable
the negative sign in all ρ¯ and CDP statistics for CCE estimates. Since these indicators
are based on the sum of pairwise correlation coefficients, the sign indicates that negative
correlation coefficients are more frequent and sizable after controlling for CD17. Finally,
17Although not reported, a closer look at bilateral residual correlations shows that this is indeed the case
and that this sum drives the value of the statistic, given that
√
2T
N(N−1) ≈ 1. The CDLM statistic remains
relatively high because of the large time series dimension compared to the number of cross-section units
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the IPS and CIPS unit root test statistics, and additional serial correlation tests, show
that residuals from all estimated models are stationary both individually and jointly.
4.6 Concluding Remarks
This paper presents a framework to analyze risk in the corporate sector that takes into
account their strong sectoral linkages and comovement. In a first part, the paper describes
a methodology to compute comprehensive forward-looking risk indicators at sector-level
based on Contingent Claims Analysis with information from balance sheets, equity mar-
kets and, more importantly, index option prices. The second part of the paper analyzes
the properties of the resulting Distance-to-Default series and sets up an econometric model
that incorporates the cross-section dependence of sectoral risk. This model allows to study
the determinants and diffusion of risk across sectors, including sector-specific drivers, the
macroeconomic and financial markets environment and proximity-driven risk spill-overs.
In particular, the paper computes forward-looking Distance-to-Deafult DD series, a
market-based indicator, for 12 of the 19 financial and corporate sectors in the euro area as
defined by the EURO STOXX indices between December 2001 and October 2009. These
series show very good properties in terms of capturing cycles and episodes of distress. The
econometric analysis relies on the Common Correlated Effects estimator of Pesaran (2006)
in order to stress the importance of cross-section dependence (CD) in the risk series over
time, which is driven by common observed and unobserved factors.
Controlling for cross-section dependence among the Distance-to-Deafult series, the first
result of this analysis shows that sectoral risk comprises a stationary idiosyncratic com-
ponent and a non-stationary common factor. This result provides empirical support to
the notion that aggregate sectoral risk evolves to a long-run equilibrium, with temporary
deviations caused by the macro-financial environment, sector-specific shocks and the cross-
sectoral dynamics.
Results of the econometric model estimation using the Common Correlated Effects
(CCE) method find evidence supporting a more relevant role of sector-specific variables as
sectoral risk determinants in the corporate sector overall at the expense of the impact from
macro-financial variables. The sector-specific drivers include risk persistence, measures of
overall sectoral performance and also direct risk spill-overs from risk in related sectors.
The macroeconomic and financial common variables are either captured as unobserved
common effects or smoothed out by construction of the Distance-to-Default series. This
empirical finding challenges much of the literature that focuses mainly on macroeconomic
risk drivers and tends to ignore sector-specific characteristics and specially interactions
either explicitly or implicitly through an aggregate analysis of the whole corporate sector.
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This study also provides empirical evidence of the high degree of heterogeneity as
concerns the relevance and responsiveness to the risk drivers used in the model, both in
macro-terms as in sector-specific terms. These results show that a macro-only focus of the
analysis of financial stability would be misleading for policy if cross-section dependence
and sectoral heterogeneity is ignored. These results make a case for a more disaggregated
analysis of risk across sectors without neglecting the inherent interactions that take place
among them. Subjects for further research include the inclusion of non-linearities in the
interaction of risk across sectors and exploring more accurate metrics to assess the direct
risk intersectoral linkages in order to extend the model to conduct stress tests.
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Appendix A. Derivation of Portfolio Distance-to-Default
Given the three principles in Contingent Claims Analysis (CCA) mentioned in Section 4.1,
company value (represented by its assets, A) is the sum of its risky debt (D) and equity
(E). Since equity is a junior claim to debt, the former can be expressed as a standard call
option on the assets with strike price equal to the value of risky debt (also known in the
literature as distress barrier or default barrier).
max{0, A−D}
For a given portfolio of I companies, individual company information is aggregated in
the following form:
AP=
∑I
i=1 Ai
, is the total value of the portfolio’s assets (unobservable).
DP =
∑I
i=1Di , is the total value of the portfolio’s risky debt.
EP =
∑I
i=1Ei , is the equity market value of the portfolio.
Given that CCA principles apply for the portfolio and the assumption of assets dis-
tributed as a Generalized Brownian Motion, the application of the standard Black-Sholes
option pricing formula yields the closed-form expression of the Portfolio Distance-to-
Default indicator t periods ahead:
DDP =
ln
(
AP
DP
)
+
(
r − 12σ2AP
)
t
σAP
√
t
where r is the rate of growth of the porfolio assets value and equals the risk-free interest
rate for the euro area. σA is portolio asset volatility.
In practice, implied portfolio asset value AP and volatility σA are not observable and must
be estimated solving the following system of simultaneous equations by numerical methods:
EP = APN(d1)− e−rtDPN(d2)σE = APEP σAN(d1)
where EP is the value of portfolio equity, σE is the equity index price return volatility.
N(•) is the cumulative normal distribution. The values of d1 and d2 are expressed as:
d1 =
ln
(
AP
DP
)
+(r+ 12σ
2
A)t
σA
√
t
, d2 = d1 − σA
√
t
The calculation of DD in the literature uses market value as the value of equity E; his-
torical, GARCH-derived or option-implied volatilities as equity price return volatility σE ;
government bond yields as the risk-free interest rate r and the face value of short-term lia-
bilities plus half of that of long-term liabilities as the default barrier D. The time horizon
t is usually set at one year.
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Appendix B. Sample Selection Methodological Notes
The analysis in the paper covers 12 out of 19 Supersectors, as classified by STOXX. The list of
Supersectors is found in Table 10. The companies included in a given Supersector Index are part
of the STOXX Europe 600, which represents large, mid and small capitalization companies across
18 European countries. Since the composition list of the STOXX Europe 600 is revised periodi-
cally, mostly according to changes in market capitalization or relevant corporate actions, the list
of companies in each Supersector portfolio is revised accordingly and updated.
Since the most relevant changes take place at the bottom of the ranking, some companies do
not stay long in the Supersector Indices and may only add noise to the series. Therefore, some
small companies were excluded from the sample under the assumption that their low weight in their
respective index would not affect the aggregation of company information by Supersector during
the calibration of DD series. In addition, some companies are reclassified and should therefore be
assigned to one Supersector only according to the time listed in a given supersector. See Tables 20
through 33 for individual cases. The list of exclusions from the sample by Supersector is below.
Banks: Banque Nationale de Belgique (BE0003008019), Banca Antonveneta (IT0003270102),
IKB (DE0008063306), Rolo Banca 1473 (IT0001070405), Cre´dit Agricole Iˆle-de-France (FR0000045528),
Emporiki Bank Of Greece (GRS006013007), Banco Pastor (ES0113770434), Marfin Financial
Group (GRS314003005), Depfa Bank (IE0072559994), Banca Fideuram (IT0000082963), Finecogroup
Spa (IT0001464921), First Active (IE0004321422), KBC Ancora (BE0003867844).
Oil & Gas: Fortum (FI0009007132), Royal Dutch Petroleum (NL0000009470, excluded due
to incorporation in the UK with a primary listing on the London Stock Exchange), Enaga´s
(ES0130960018).
Insurance: Fortis (BE0003801181), Nu¨rnberger Beteiligungs (DE0008435967), Irish Life &
Permanent (IE00B59NXW72).
Utilities: SolarWorld (DE0005108401).
Technology: SAFRAN (FR0000073272), Eutelsat Communication (FR0010221234), Amadeus
Global Travel Distribution (ES0109169013), Terra Networks (ES0178174019), Infogrames Enter-
tainment (FR0000052573), Wanadoo (FR0000124158), Riverdeep Group (IE0001521057), Tiscali
(IT0001453924), Equant (NL0000200889).
Industrial Goods & Services: Linde (DE0006483001), Pirelli & Co. (IT0000072725),
Gamesa (ES0143416115), Wendel Investissement (FR0000121204), Q-Cells (DE0005558662), In-
dra Sistemas (ES0118594417), Ackermans & Van Haaren (BE0003764785), Altran Technologies
(FR0000034639), Aixtron (DE0005066203), CGIP (FR0000121022), Eurotunnel (FR0000125379),
Snecma (FR0005328747), Rexel (FR0000125957), ASF (FR0005512555), Aurea (ES0111847036).
Chemicals: Altana (DE0007600801), Degussa (DE0005421903), Celanese (DE0005753008).
Food & Beverage: Parmalat Finanziaria (IT0003121644), IAWS Group (IE0004554287).
Media: RTL Group (LU0061462528), Premiere (DE000PREM111), Gestevisio´n Telecinco
(ES0152503035), Tele Atlas (NL0000233948), Fox Kids Europe (NL0000352524).
Healthcare: Fresenius Medical Care (DE0005785802), Alapis (GRS322003013), Altana (DE0007600801),
Schwarz Pharma (DE0007221905), Omega Pharma (BE0003785020), Instrumentarium(FI0009000509).
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Appendix C. Data Sources
The structure of balance sheets varies by sector. Companies are classified into the following sectors:
Banks, Insurance Companies and Industrials.
Balance-sheet Information,Obtained at quarterly/half-yearly frequence from Annual and
Interim Reports.
• Total Assets. For banks, Bankscope (code 2025); for Insurance Companies, Thomson World-
scope (code WC02999); for Industrials, Thomson Worldscope (code WC02999A).
• Short-term Liabilities: For banks, Bankscope (Deposits and Short Term Funding, code 2030);
for Insurance Companies, Thomson Worldscope (code WC03051A); for Industrials, Thomson
Worldscope (code WC03101A).
• Total Equity: For banks, Bankscope (Deposits and Short Term Funding, code 2055); for In-
surance Companies and Industrials, Difference between Total Assets (Thomson Worldscope,
code WC02999A) and Total Liabilities (Thomson Worldscope, code WC03351A).
Market Information.
• Sector Index Tickers. Thomson Datastream (codes DJESBNK, DJESTEL, DJESEGY,
DJESINS, DJESTEC, DJESAUT, DJESUSP, DJESIGS, DJESCHM, DJESFBV, DJESMED,
DJESHTC).
• Market Capitalization. Thomson Datastream (code MV).
• Price Indices. Thomson Datastream (code PI).
• Index Options Implied Volatilities: Thomson Datastream (codes DJBXC.SERIESC, DJCXC.SERIESC,
DJEXC.SERIESC, DJIXC.SERIESC, DJTXC.SERIESC, DJAXC.SERIESC, DJUXC.SERIESC,
DJIGC.SERIESC, DJCMC.SERIESC, DJFBC.SERIESC, DJMXC.SERIESC, DJHXC.SERIESC,
DJBXC.SERIESP, DJCXC.SERIESP, DJEXC.SERIESP, DJIXC.SERIESP, DJTXC.SERIESP,
DJAXC.SERIESP, DJUXC.SERIESP, DJIGC.SERIESP, DJCMC.SERIESP, DJFBC.SERIESP,
DJMXC.SERIESP, DJHXC.SERIESP).
• Interest rates. Thomson Datastream (code EMBRYLD).
Macro-Financial Variables and Sector-specific Variables.
• VIX Volatility Index, V IXt: Chicago Board Options Exchange.
• Money Market Rate, R3Mt: Three-month Euribor Rate, ECB.
• Oil Price, OILt, Brent Crude 1-Month-Forward Price, ECB, level.
• Euro Area Industrial Production Index, ∆PIt: ECB, Annual rate of change, working day
and seasonally adjusted.
• Euro Area Inflation Rate, ∆CPt: ECB, HICP Overall index, Annual rate of change, Neither
seasonally nor working day adjusted.
• Price-Earnings Ratio, ∆PEt: Thomson Datastream (PE). Weighted average of PERs of
index constituents, Annual rate of change.
• Dividend Yield, ∆DYt: Thomson Datastream, Market-value weighted average of individual
DYs of index constituents, Annual rate of change.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Banks Sample - PDF
Bank Symbol1 Data Underlying Data
Source ISIN Code Availability
1 Citigroup CITI CBOE US1729671016 02/01/2004-30/12/2008
2 Lehman Brothers LEH CBOE US5249081002 02/01/2004-30/12/2008
3 Deutsche Bank DBK Eurex DE0005140008 02/01/2004-30/06/2009
4 UBS UBSN Eurex CH0024899483 02/01/2004-30/06/2009
5 Credit Suisse CSGN Eurex CH0012138530 02/01/2004-30/06/2009
6 BNP Paribas BN1 Euronext FR0000131104 02/01/2004-30/12/2008
7 Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale GL1 Euronext FR0000130809 02/01/2004-30/12/2008
8 Barclays BBL Euronext GB0031348658 02/01/2004-30/12/2008
9 RBS RBS Euronext GB0007547838 02/01/2004-30/12/2008
Notes: (1) As defined by the corresponding exchanges.
Table 2: Correlation Matrix - PDF Implied Volatilities (levels)
CITI LEH DBK UBSN CSGN BN1 GL1 BBL
CITI
LEH 0.876
DBK 0.780 0.679
UBSN 0.941 0.871 0.793
CSGN 0.861 0.777 0.867 0.909
BN1 0.871 0.759 0.882 0.873 0.887
GL1 0.890 0.757 0.858 0.912 0.907 0.944
BBL 0.945 0.860 0.791 0.921 0.866 0.873 0.898
RBS 0.939 0.872 0.767 0.917 0.859 0.854 0.886 0.966
Notes: Computed on weekly averages of daily observations over the whole timespan.
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Table 3: Correlation Matrix - PDF Implied Volatilities (first differences)
CITI LEH DBK UBSN CSGN BN1 GL1 BBL
CITI
LEH 0.516
DBK 0.422 0.420
UBSN 0.632 0.379 0.480
CSGN 0.500 0.539 0.486 0.610
BN1 0.325 0.133 0.445 0.395 0.407
GL1 0.468 0.334 0.536 0.492 0.419 0.595
BBL 0.491 0.527 0.528 0.462 0.544 0.403 0.531
RBS 0.359 0.391 0.383 0.454 0.458 0.202 0.303 0.548
Notes: Computed on weekly averages of daily observations over the whole timespan.
Table 4: Historical Distribution of PDF Implied Volatilities
Observations Mean Median Maximum Minimum Standard Skewness Kurtosis
Deviation
CITI 218 0.300 0.183 1.477 0.104 0.243 2.205 8.457
LEH 192 0.404 0.272 1.654 0.119 0.294 2.083 6.975
DBK 283 0.335 0.249 1.845 0.099 0.243 2.618 10.983
UBSN 264 0.352 0.218 1.520 0.108 0.269 1.520 4.579
CSGN 277 0.343 0.252 1.151 0.146 0.224 1.859 5.598
BN1 254 0.284 0.230 1.140 0.113 0.172 2.807 11.691
GL1 258 0.311 0.240 1.360 0.146 0.195 2.672 11.589
BBL 224 0.375 0.267 1.698 0.165 0.261 2.437 9.599
RBS 239 0.330 0.210 1.968 0.136 0.285 2.879 13.020
Notes: Computed on weekly averages of daily observations over the whole timespan.
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Table 5: Correlation Matrix: CDS - Distance-to-Default series (levels)
CDS/DD CITI LEH DBK UBSN CSGN BN1 GL1 BBL RBS
CITI -0.812 -0.740 -0.539 -0.773 -0.735 -0.698 -0.724 -0.757 -0.771
LEH -0.734 -0.694 -0.525 -0.697 -0.662 -0.635 -0.639 -0.693 -0.699
DBK -0.865 -0.789 -0.599 -0.806 -0.772 -0.747 -0.772 -0.815 -0.834
UBSN -0.783 -0.720 -0.526 -0.748 -0.714 -0.676 -0.705 -0.733 -0.740
CSGN -0.772 -0.705 -0.525 -0.707 -0.686 -0.645 -0.673 -0.706 -0.717
BN1 -0.798 -0.716 -0.520 -0.751 -0.719 -0.688 -0.724 -0.748 -0.764
GL1 -0.782 -0.736 -0.534 -0.752 -0.720 -0.679 -0.705 -0.734 -0.742
BBL -0.859 -0.787 -0.578 -0.810 -0.767 -0.745 -0.771 -0.807 -0.827
RBS -0.824 -0.751 -0.556 -0.778 -0.748 -0.712 -0.742 -0.773 -0.787
Notes: Computed on weekly averages of daily observations over the whole timespan.
Table 6: DD-CDS Granger Causality Tests (levels)
DD does not CDS does not DD does not CDS does not DD does not CDS does not DD does not CDS does not
cause CDS cause DD cause CDS cause DD cause CDS cause DD cause CDS cause DD
Lag=1 Lag=1 Lag=2 Lag=2 Lag=3 Lag=3 Lag=4 Lag=4
CITI 9.93* 3.50 8.77* 1.49 3.95* 0.74 3.33* 1.29
LEH 3.95* 2.88 1.98 0.99 2.09 0.79 1.69 0.49
DBK 4.71* 26.38* 3.11* 9.46* 2.30 4.58* 2.26 4.17*
UBSN 4.01* 0.79 3.14* 0.75 2.35 1.10 1.85 0.88
CSGN 5.96* 3.33 4.50* 2.22 3.17* 1.67 2.32 1.21
BN1 2.83 6.74* 3.18* 3.52* 2.29 3.06* 1.39 2.20
GL1 4.00* 4.82* 2.63 1.88 2.09 1.78 1.48 1.19
BBL 6.86* 6.34* 5.64* 3.37* 3.27* 2.00* 2.15 1.30
RBS 2.61 25.76* 10.65* 15.72* 3.68* 12.58* 5.02* 14.21*
Notes: * indicates rejection of the null at 5%.
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Table 8: Description of Variables
Balance Sheet Variables
Variable Definition
Total Assets As reported in Annual and Interim Reports. Source. Bankscope, code
2025.
Short-term Liabilities Deposits and Short term funding. Source. Bankscope, code 2030.
Total Equity As reported in Annual and Interim Reports. Source. Bankscope, code
2055.
Daily Market-based Variables
Variable Definition
Risk-free Interest Rate Benchmark ten-year bond yield of country where the bank in question
is headquartered. Source. Thomson Datastream.
Market Capitalization Total market value measured by close share price multiplied by the or-
dinary number of shares in individual issue. Expressed in thousands of
domestic currency (converted into euro at official ECB exchange rates).
Source. Thomson Datastream.
Exchange Rates End-of-day bilateral exchange rates against the euro. Source. European
Central Bank.
Equity Implied Volatilities Daily at-the-money implied volatilities of call and put options on indi-
vidual bank shares (American style), traded at NYSE Euronext, Eurex
and Nasdaq OMX. Source. Bloomberg, codes HIST CALL IMP VOL
for calls and HIST PUT IMP VOL for puts.
Index Implied Volatilities Daily at-the-money implied volatilities of call and put options on the DJ
STOXX Banks Index (European style), traded at Eurex. Source. Thom-
son Datastream, codes DJ6BC.SERIESC for calls and DJ6BC.SERIESP
for puts.
Table 9: Granger Causality Tests
Lag DD does not DDECB does not DD
P does not DDECB does not
Granger Cause DDECB Granger Cause DD Granger Cause DDECB Granger Cause DD
P
1 13.5423 2.4077 12.5345 0.9557
0.0004 0.1248 0.0007 0.3313
3 3.3270 1.8711 3.0514 1.1649
0.0244 0.1423 0.0340 0.3293
6 2.0159 1.5253 0.8912 2.9627
0.0769 0.1848 0.5070 0.0131
12 2.6637 1.5157 1.4473 1.8289
0.0089 0.1549 0.1815 0.0727
24 3.9901 1.1544 1.4198 2.1132
0.0242 0.4427 0.3151 0.1371
Table reports F-statistics with p-values below. End-of-month data for Average DD (DD) and Portfolio
DD (DDP ) series. ECB series are monthly median DD computed for a sample of LCBG. Sample used for
test: 30-Sep-2002 to 31-May-2009 due to ECB series data availability.
Notes: Series of implied volatilities start dates:(1) 25-Sep-01 ,(2) 31-Jul-02,(3) 23-Sep-02,(4) 19-May-03. Su-
persector codes are assigned according to the ICB methodology prior to September 2004.(a) Portfolio size does not
include companies’ predecessors, for more details, see Appendix C. (b) Average monthly volume over the whole
timespan. (c) Year-end average over the whole time span in thousands of euros.
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Table 10: Supersectors Sample
ICB Supersector ICB Portfolio Options Market
Supersector Code Industry Sizea Volumeb Capitalizationc
1 Banks1 BNK Financials 40 24894.6 490278.1
2 Telecommunications1 TLS Telecommunications 17 5439.5 245011.1
3 Oil & Gas2 ENE Oil & Gas 19 5130.3 272077.1
4 Insurance2 INS Financials 17 5406.9 233824.6
5 Technology1 TEC Technology 21 2952.7 233154.2
6 Automobiles & Parts2 ATO Consumer Goods 13 3161.0 117228.1
7 Utilities3 UTI Utilities 22 2536.2 216164.7
8 Industrial Goods & Services4 IGS Industrials 56 412.6 108511.6
9 Chemicals4 CHM Basic Materials 14 162.1 147751.8
10 Food & Beverage4 FOB Consumer Goods 13 677.4 94878.9
11 Media3 MDI Consumer Services 25 620.0 87118.6
12 Health Care1 HCR Health Care 17 116.7 100830.1
Table 11: Preliminary Cross-section Dependence Analysis - DD Series
ρ¯ CDP CDLM
DDi,t 0.843 66.7* 4486.4*
∆DDi,t 0.595 46.9* 2245.4*
Notes: ρ¯, CDP and CDLM are computed as detailed in Section 4.4.3 using residuals of regressions on a
sector-specific intercept. * indicates the series show cross-section dependence at 5% level.
Table 12: Contiguity Matrix
BNK TLS ENE INS TEC ATO UTI IGS CHM FOB MDI HCR
BNK 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TLS 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ENE 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
INS 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TEC 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
ATO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
UTI 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
IGS 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0
CHM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
FOB 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
MDI 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
HCR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Notes: If element i, j = 1, the supersectors in row i and column j are considered neighbours. See Section 4.4.2
for more details.
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Table 13: Residual Cross-section Dependence of ADF(p) Regressions
Average cross-correlation (ρ¯)
ADF(0) ADF(1) ADF(2) ADF(3) ADF(4) ADF(5) ADF(6)
DDi,t 0.605 0.603 0.608 0.608 0.610 0.610 0.596
∆DYi,t 0.383 0.350 0.352 0.348 0.346 0.342 0.322
∆PEi,t 0.030 0.023 0.024 0.021 0.040 0.036 0.034
DD
n
i,t 0.716 0.715 0.719 0.718 0.719 0.720 0.710
Pesaran test (CDP )
ADF(0) ADF(1) ADF(2) ADF(3) ADF(4) ADF(5) ADF(6)
DDi,t 47.6* 47.2* 47.4* 47.1* 47.0* 46.7* 45.4*
∆DYi,t 27.6* 25.1* 25.3* 25.0* 24.9* 24.6* 23.2*
∆PEi,t 2.2* 1.7* 1.8* 1.5 2.9* 2.6* 2.4*
DD
n
i,t 56.4* 56.0* 56.0* 55.6* 55.4* 55.2* 54.1*
LM test (CDLM )
ADF(0) ADF(1) ADF(2) ADF(3) ADF(4) ADF(5) ADF(6)
DDi,t 2315.2* 2274.8* 2289.7* 2263.9* 2253.7* 2226.6* 2109.7*
∆DYi,t 946.6* 812.3* 813.1* 795.4* 777.6* 762.9* 685.1*
∆PEi,t 157.7* 127.3* 135.9* 159.2* 151.3* 154.2* 154.2*
DD
n
i,t 3268.3* 3221.9* 3220.8* 3175.5* 3148.6* 3124.7* 3007.4*
Notes: pth-order Augmented Dickey Fuller ADF(p) regressions are computed for each Supersector i. Tests for
∆DYi,t and ∆PEi,t are based on a reduced sample N = 11, excluding the Oil & Gas Supersector due to short
series length. No linear trend is included. * indicates rejection of the the null hypothesis of no error cross-sectional
dependence at 5% level.
Table 14: Panel Unit Root Tests
CIPS Panel Unit Root Tests
CADF(0) CADF(1) CADF(2) CADF(3) CADF(4) CADF(5) CADF(6)
DDi,t -3.49*** -3.41*** -2.92*** -2.77*** -2.62*** -2.66*** -2.44***
∆DYi,t -2.19* -2.29** -2.73*** -2.79*** -2.77*** -2.61*** -2.59***
∆PEi,t -4.29*** -3.32*** -2.83*** -3.19*** -2.81*** -2.56*** -2.51***
DD
n
i,t -3.65*** -2.29*** -2.73*** -2.79*** -2.77*** -2.61*** -2.59***
IPS Panel Unit Root Tests
ADF(0) ADF(1) ADF(2) ADF(3) ADF(4) ADF(5) ADF(6)
DDi,t -1.34* -1.68** -0.80 -0.66 -0.40 -0.55 -0.45
∆DYi,t -0.43 -2.29*** -3.91*** -4.39*** -3.82*** -4.11*** -5.94***
∆PEi,t -9.97*** -6.39*** -4.8*** -5.96*** -4.84*** -4.26*** -4.81***
DD
n
i,t -1.05 -1.39* -0.47 -0.33 -0.14 -0.18 -0.14
Notes: Tests for ∆DYi,t and ∆PEi,t are based on a reduced sample N = 11, excluding the Oil & Gas
Supersector due to short series length. No linear trend is included. ***,**,* indicate rejection of the the null
hypothesis of unit root at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 15: Panel Unit Root Tests
Sensitivity analysis: CIPS Panel Unit Root Tests
Excluded
SupersectorCADF(0) CADF(1) CADF(2) CADF(3) CADF(4) CADF(5) CADF(6)
DDi,t
BNK -3.41 -3.44 -2.96 -2.81 -2.65 -2.74 -2.49
TLS -3.59 -3.50 -2.97 -2.84 -2.66 -2.62 -2.44
ENE -3.56 -3.45 -2.89 -2.74 -2.53 -2.63 -2.34
INS -3.37 -3.23 -2.90 -2.76 -2.55 -2.60 -2.38
TEC -3.63 -3.52 -3.03 -2.89 -2.73 -2.74 -2.52
ATO -3.26 -3.16 -2.78 -2.65 -2.51 -2.65 -2.42
UTI -3.46 -3.36 -2.81 -2.69 -2.52 -2.60 -2.40
IGS -3.56 -3.45 -2.94 -2.77 -2.64 -2.71 -2.53
CHM -3.26 -3.32 -2.83 -2.65 -2.55 -2.50 -2.32
FOB -3.49 -3.32 -2.88 -2.68 -2.60 -2.67 -2.40
MDI -3.62 -3.54 -3.02 -2.91 -2.76 -2.73 -2.51
HCR -3.59 -3.51 -3.01 -2.83 -2.68 -2.71 -2.52
DD
n
i,t
BNK -3.52 -3.39 -3.15 -3.00 -2.79 -2.74 -2.54
TLS -3.79 -3.66 -3.28 -3.14 -2.99 -2.91 -2.66
ENE -3.72 -3.63 -3.13 -3.01 -2.84 -2.84 -2.61
INS -3.53 -3.62 -3.16 -3.01 -2.86 -2.89 -2.62
TEC -3.72 -3.63 -3.15 -3.01 -2.88 -2.78 -2.54
ATO -3.72 -3.57 -3.16 -3.01 -2.86 -2.85 -2.63
UTI -3.74 -3.61 -3.13 -3.02 -2.81 -2.81 -2.51
IGS -3.75 -3.61 -3.22 -3.09 -2.95 -2.89 -2.68
CHM -3.66 -3.57 -3.14 -2.95 -2.78 -2.76 -2.56
FOB -3.39 -3.29 -2.96 -2.85 -2.69 -2.73 -2.50
MDI -3.71 -3.57 -3.11 -2.99 -2.84 -2.81 -2.56
HCR -3.50 -3.48 -3.06 -2.90 -2.79 -2.67 -2.48
Notes: No linear trend is included. All statistics reject the null hypothesis of unit root at 5%.
Table 16: Unit Root Tests - PANIC Method
Variable Common Factor Idiosyncratic Factor
ADF statistic IPS Wt¯-statistic
DDi,t -1.574 -7.324*
DD
n
i,t -1.566 -8.661*
Notes: ADF and IPS Wt¯ test statistics’ lag lengths are determined by SIC criterion. * indicate rejection of the
the null hypothesis of unit root. Results of IPS test are robust to equal lag lengths for p = 1, . . . , 6.
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Table 17: Unit Root Tests - Macroeconomic and Financial Risk Variables
Variable Level First
Difference
V IXt -2.07 -7.78***
R3Mt -1.73 -3.92***
OILt -2.11 -6.09***
∆PIt -2.79* -2.60*
∆CPt -6.00*** -4.77***
Notes: Intercept included only in levels, lag length determined by AIC and HQ criteria. ***,**,* indicate
rejection of the the null hypothesis of unit root at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Results are robust to
inclusion of trend and seasonal dummies; and also to structural breaks in two cases (∆PIt, ∆CPt).
Table 18: Estimation Results
Dependent Variable MG MG MG CCEMG CCEMG CCEMG
DDi,t [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Intercept 0.481** 0.612** 0.402** -0.058 0.033 -0.008
(0.068) (0.101) (0.183) (0.136) (0.182) (0.196)
∆V IXt -0.083** -0.081** -0.082** 0.000 -0.001 0.000
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
∆R3Mt 0.670** 0.617** 0.614** -0.010 0.004 -0.004
(0.103) (0.086) (0.089) (0.095) (0.086) (0.083)
∆OILt -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
∆PIt 0.000 0.001 -0.003 0.000 0.002 0.000
(0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
∆CPt -0.025** -0.021 0.002 0.011 -0.004 0.003
(0.011) (0.019) (0.026) (0.021) (0.019) (0.022)
∆DYi,t 0.000 0.000 -0.002** -0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
∆PEi,t 0.002 0.002* 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
DDi,t−1 0.921** 0.897** 0.798** 0.740** 0.672** 0.591**
(0.008) (0.014) (0.026) (0.042) (0.050) (0.056)
DD
n
i,t−1 0.123** 0.013
(0.039) (0.074)
Observations 1128 1072 1072 1128 1072 1072
ρ¯ 0.424 0.431 0.434 -0.082 -0.081 -0.077
CDP 33.4 33.2 33.4 -6.5 -6.3 -5.9
CDLM 1207.0 1202.0 1208.0 176.7 195.0 175.4
IPS Wt¯-stat -31.724 -31.306 -31.486 -31.197 -31.590 -31.127
CIPS-stat -6.19 -6.19 -6.19 -6.19 -6.19 -6.19
Notes: MG and CCEMG stand for OLS Mean Group and Common Correlated Effects Mean Group estimates
respectively. Standard errors are given in parenthesis. *,** denotes significance at 10% and 5%, respectively. CD
statistics (ρ¯, CDLM and CDP ) and panel unit root tests are computed on residuals of each equation. See Section
4.4.3 and Section 4.4.4 for definitions, respectively.
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Table 19: CCE Estimates of all Cross Section Units
ICB Supersector
DDi,t BNK TLS ENE
(a) INS TEC ATO UTI IGS CHM FOB MDI HCR
Intercept -1.280** 0.600** 0.386 -0.393 -0.098 -0.698** -0.234 0.384 -0.292 0.697 -0.341 1.175**
∆V IXt 0.004 0.013 -0.001 0.003 -0.014 -0.021 -0.008 0.026** -0.008 0.001 -0.001 0.005
∆R3Mt -0.362 0.248 -0.030 -0.010 0.105 0.318 0.331 -0.270 0.314 -0.151 -0.550** 0.007
∆OILt -0.012 0.006 0.022* -0.015* 0.009 -0.008 -0.011 0.009 0.019 -0.016 -0.006 0.000
∆PIt 0.005 -0.008 0.018 0.014 -0.005 -0.012 -0.010 -0.002 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006
∆CPt -0.016 -0.038 -0.069 0.015 -0.017 0.132 0.080 -0.047 0.029 0.112 -0.001 -0.140
∆DYi,t 0.001 0.002** -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 -0.005 -0.003 0.000 0.003** -0.005
∆PEi,t 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.008 0.001 0.000 0.011** 0.000 0.000
DDi,t−1 0.420** 0.555** 0.796** 0.646** 0.846** 0.299** 0.761** 0.334 0.370** 0.688** 0.784** 0.591**
DD
n
i,t−1 0.034 0.168 0.121* 0.046 0.160 -0.045 0.029 -0.838* 0.020 0.057 0.433** -0.039
Notes: Individual estimates come from model [6] in Table 18. *,** denotes significance at 10% and 5%,
respectively. (a) Oil & Gas Supersector’s equation excludes ∆DYi,t and ∆PEi,t due to short series length.
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Table 20: Supersector Constituents List - Banks (BNK)
Name ISIN Code Country Portfolio constituent
from: to:
1 Deutsche Bank DE0005140008 DE 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
2 BNP Paribas(1) FR0000131104 FR 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
→ Fortis(2)(3) BE0003801181 BE 31-Dec-01 21-Sep-09
→ Banca Nazionale IT0001254884 IT 31-Dec-01 22-May-06
del Lavoro(2)
3 Cre´dit Agricole FR0000045072 FR 18-Mar-02 31-Oct-09
→ Cre´dit Lyonnais(2) FR0000184202 FR 31-Dec-01 19-Jun-03
4 Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale FR0000130809 FR 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
5 UniCredit IT0000064854 IT 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
→ Capitalia(2)(4) IT0003121495 IT 31-Dec-01 1-Oct-07
→ HypoVereinsbank(2)(5) DE0008022005 DE 31-Dec-01 19-Jun-06
→ Bank Austria(2) AT0000995006 AT 24-Oct-03 5-Dec-05
6 Santander(6) ES0113900J37 ES 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
→ ABN Amro(7) NL0000301109 NL 31-Dec-01 2-Nov-07
7 Dexia(8) BE0003796134 BE 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
8 Commerzbank(9) DE0008032004 DE 10-Aug-07 31-Oct-09
9 Intesa Sanpaolo(10) IT0000072618 IT 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
→ San Paolo IMI(2) IT0001269361 IT 31-Dec-01 2-Jan-07
10 Natixis FR0000120685 FR 19-Apr-05 31-Oct-09
11 BBVA ES0113211835 ES 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
12 KBC BE0003565737 BE 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
→ Almanij(2) BE0003703171 BE 31-Dec-01 3-Mar-05
13 Deutsche Postbank DE0008001009 DE 20-Sep-04 31-Oct-09
14 Erste Group Bank(11) AT0000652011 AT 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
15 Bank Of Ireland IE0030606259 IE 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
16 Banca Monte dei IT0001334587 IT 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
Paschi di Siena(12)
17 Allied Irish Banks IE0000197834 IE 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
Notes: (1) Increase in share capital and free float change on 19-May-09. (2) Takeover. (3) Also constituent prior
to 21-Jun-04. (4) Formerly Banca di Roma. (5) Also constituent between 24-Nov-05 and 19-Jun-06 after takeover.
(6) Increase in share capital due to takeover of Abbey on 16-Nov-04. (7) Takeover by Royal Bank of Scotland, Fortis
and Santander. (8) Increase in share capital on 8-Jan-09. (9) Increase in share capital on 23-Jul-09. (10) Banca
Intesa is the predecessor company. Increase in free float on 19-Apr-04. (11) Increase in share capital on 31-Jan-06.
(12) Increase in share capital due to takeover of Banca Agricola Mantovana and Banca Toscana on 31-Mar-03.
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Table 21: Supersector Constituents List - Banks (BNK) (cont.)
Name ISIN Code Country Portfolio constituent
from: to:
18 Banco Popolare(13) IT0004231566 IT 2-Jul-07 31-Oct-09
→ Banca Popolare Italiana IT0000064300 IT 31-Dec-01 2-Jul-07
→ BP di Verona e Novara IT0003262513 IT 4-Jun-02 2-Jul-07
→ BP di Novara IT0000064508 IT 31-Dec-01 4-Jun-02
→ BP di Verona IT0001065215 IT 31-Dec-01 4-Jun-02
19 UBI Banca(14) IT0003487029 IT 2-Apr-07 31-Oct-09
→ Banca Lombarda IT0000062197 IT 31-Dec-01 2-Apr-07
e Piemontese
→ BP di Bergamo IT0000064409 IT 31-Dec-01 1-Jul-03
→ BP Commercio e Industria IT0000064193 IT 31-Dec-01 1-Jul-03
20 Banco Popular Espan˜ol ES0113790531 ES 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
21 Anglo Irish Bank(15) IE00B06H8J93 IE 31-Dec-01 26-Jan-09
22 National Bank Of Greece GRS003013000 GR 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
23 BCP PTBCP0AM0007 PT 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
24 Raiffeisen International AT0000606306 AT 20-Jun-05 31-Oct-09
25 Banco Sabadell(16) ES0113860A34 ES 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
26 EFG Eurobank Ergasias GRS323013003 GR 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
27 Banco Espirito Santo PTBES0AM0007 PT 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
28 Mediobanca(17) IT0000062957 IT 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
29 Alpha Bank GRS015013006 GR 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
30 Bank Of Greece GRS004013009 GR 14-Aug-03 31-Oct-09
31 Bankinter ES0113679I37 ES 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
32 BP dell’Emilia IT0000066123 IT 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
Romagna(18)
33 Piraeus Bank(19) GRS014013007 GR 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
34 BP di Milano IT0000064482 IT 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
35 Banco BPI(20) PTBPI0AM0004 PT 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
36 Banca Carige IT0003211601 IT 20-Jun-05 31-Oct-09
37 Pohjola Bank FI0009003222 FI 18-Sep-06 31-Oct-09
38 Banco de Valencia ES0113980F34 ES 23-Jun-03 31-Oct-09
39 BP di Sondrio(21) IT0000784196 IT 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
40 Credito Valtellinese IT0000064516 IT 22-Dec-08 31-Oct-09
Notes: (13) Merger on 2-Jul-07 between BP Italiana (IT0000064300, formerly BP di Lodi) and BP di Verona
e Novara (IT0003262513, merger between BP di Novara and BP di Verona in June 2002). (14) Merger on 2-Apr-07
between Banche Popolare Unite (predecessor) and Banca Lombarda e Piamontese. The former was formed by the
merger between BP di Bergamo, BP Commercio e Industria and BP di Ruino e di Varese (no data) on 1-Jul-03.
(15) Previous ISIN IE0001987894, nationalized. (16) Increase in share capital on 15-Mar-04. (17) Also constituent
prior to 23-Dec-02. (18) Temporary deletion between 22-Dec-03 and 10-Sep-09. (19) Increase in share capital on
2-Jan-04. (20) Also constituent prior to 24-Mar-03. (21) Temporary deletion between 22-Dec-03 and 21-Sep-09.
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Table 22: Supersector Constituents List - Telecommunications (TLS)
Name ISIN Code Country Portfolio constituent
from: to:
1 Deutsche Telekom DE0005557508 DE 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
2 Telefo´nica ES0178430E18 ES 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
→ Telefo´nica Mo´viles(1) ES0178401016 ES 31-Dec-01 28-Jul-06
3 France Telecom FR0000133308 FR 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
→ Orange(2) FR0000079196 FR 31-Dec-01 20-Oct-03
4 Telecom Italia IT0003497168 IT 4-Aug-03 31-Oct-09
→ Telecom Italia(3) IT0001127429 IT 31-Dec-01 04-Aug-03
→ Olivetti IT0001137311 IT 31-Dec-01 04-Aug-03
→ TIM(4) IT0001052049 IT 31-Dec-01 30-Jun-05
5 KPN(5) NL0000009082 NL 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
6 Portugal Telecom PTPTC0AM0009 PT 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
7 OTE GRS260333000 GR 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
→ Cosmote Mobile(6) GRS408333003 GR 22-Sep-03 14-Dec-07
8 Telekom Austria AT0000720008 AT 18-Mar-02 31-Oct-09
9 Belgacom BE0003810273 BE 21-Jun-04 31-Oct-09
10 Elisa Corporation(7) FI0009007884 FI 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
11 Mobistar BE0003735496 BE 19-Jun-03 31-Oct-09
12 Neuf Cegetel(8) FR0004166072 FR 14-Nov-07 25-Jun-08
13 Fastweb(9) IT0001423562 IT 22-Dec-03 24-Sep-07
14 Eircom Group(10) GB0034341890 IE 21-Jun-04 18-Aug-06
15 Vodafone-Panafon GRS307333005 GR 31-Dec-01 28-Jan-04
Hellenic(11)
16 Vodafone Telecel(11) PTTLE0AM0004 PT 31-Dec-01 07-Apr-03
17 Sonera(12) FI0009007371 FI 31-Dec-01 09-Dec-02
Notes: (1) Telefo´nica takes over Telefo´nica Mo´viles. (2) France Telecom takes over Orange. (3) Olivetti takes
over Telecom Italia and is renamed to Telecom Italia. (4) Telecom Italia takes over TIM. (5) KPN increases share
capital on 26-Mar-02. (6) OTE takes over Cosmote Mobile. (7) Elisa Corporation increases share capital on 18-
Nov-05. (8) Taken over by SFR. (9) Formerly e.Biscom, taken over by Swisscom. (10) Taken over by Babcock &
Brown Capital. (11) Taken over by Vodafone Group. (12) Taken over by Telia.
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Table 23: Supersector Constituents List - Oil & Gas (ENE)
Name ISIN Code Country Portfolio constituent
from: to:
1 Total(1) FR0000120271 FR 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
2 ENI IT0003132476 IT 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
3 Repsol YPF ES0173516115 ES 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
4 OMV AT0000743059 AT 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
5 SAIPEM IT0000068525 IT 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
6 CEPSA(2) ES0132580319 ES 31-Dec-01 22-Jun-09
7 Technip FR0000131708 FR 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
8 GALP Energia PTGAL0AM0009 PT 10-Aug-07 31-Oct-09
9 CGGVeritas(3) FR0000120164 FR 19-Jun-06 31-Oct-09
10 Neste Oil(4) FI0009013296 FI 19-Apr-05 31-Oct-09
11 Gamesa(5) ES0143416115 ES 18-Nov-03 31-Oct-09
12 Saras IT0000433307 IT 23-Mar-09 21-Sep-09
13 Bourbon(6) FR0004548873 FR 19-Dec-05 31-Oct-09
14 SBM Offshore(7) NL0000360618 NL 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
15 Q-Cells(8) DE0005558662 DE 31-Jul-06 31-Oct-09
16 SolarWorld(9) DE0005108401 DE 20-Mar-06 31-Oct-09
17 FUGRO NL0000352565 NL 20-Mar-06 31-Oct-09
18 Maurel & Prom(10) FR0000051070 FR 21-Mar-05 31-Oct-09
19 Dragon Oil IE0000590798 IE 23-Jun-08 22-Dec-08
Notes: (1) Decreased weighting on 18-May-06 due to spin-off of Arkema. (2) Temporary deletion between
18-Jun-07 and 22-Dec-08. (3) CGG takes over Veritas DGC and increases share capital on 17-Jan-07. (4) Spun-off
from Fortum on 19-Apr-05. (5) Classified as Industrial Goods & Services between 18-Nov-03 and 22-Sep-08. (6)
Also constituent between 19-Dec-05 and 20-Mar-06. (7) IHC Caland N.V. (NL0000360584) prior to May 05. (8)
Also constituent between 31-Jul-06 and 22-Sep-08. (9) Also constituent between 20-Mar-06 and 22-Sep-08. (10)
Temporary deletion between and 19-Mar-07 and 22-Jun-09.
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Table 24: Supersector Constituents List - Insurance (INS)
Name ISIN Code Country Portfolio constituent
from: to:
1 ING(1) NL0000303600 DE 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
2 Allianz DE0008404005 DE 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
→ RAS(2) IT0000062825 IT 31-Dec-01 16-Oct-06
3 AXA(3) FR0000120628 DE 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
4 Assicurazioni Generali IT0000062072 IT 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
→ Alleanza Assicurazioni(2) IT0000078193 IT 31-Dec-01 1-Oct-09
→ AMB Generali Holding(2) DE0008400029 DE 31-Dec-01 18-Sep-06
5 AEGON NL0000303709 NL 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
6 CNP Assurances FR0000120222 FR 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
7 Munich Re DE0008430026 DE 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
8 Fondiaria-SAI IT0001463071 IT 7-Jan-03 31-Oct-09
→ La Fondiaria IT0001062097 IT 31-Dec-01 7-Jan-03
Assicurazioni(2)(4)
9 Unipol Gruppo IT0001074571 IT 22-Sep-03 31-Oct-09
Finanziario(5)
10 MAPFRE(6) ES0124244E34 ES 23-Jun-03 31-Oct-09
11 Hannover Re DE0008402215 DE 5-Jan-04 31-Oct-09
12 Vienna Insurance(7) AT0000908504 AT 25-Mar-08 31-Oct-09
13 SCOR(8) FR0010411983 FR 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
14 Mediolanum IT0001279501 IT 31-Dec-01 21-Aug-07
15 Sampo FI0009003305 FI 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
16 Cattolica Assicurazioni IT0000784154 IT 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
17 AGF FR0000125924 FR 31-Dec-01 7-May-07
Notes: (1) Also constituent prior to 24-Jun-02. (2) Takeover. (3) Increased weighting due to takeover of
FINAXA on 22-Dec-05 and decreases share share capital on 9-Jan-06. (4) SAI is the predecessor company. (5)
Alternate listing of ordinary and preference shares (IT0001074589). Temporary deletion between 22-Mar-04 and
19-Dec-05. (6) Increase in share capital on 7-Mar-07 and on 14-Jul-08. (7) Increase in share capital on 13-May-08.
(8) Temporary deletion between 23-Dec-02 and 22-Mar-04. Increase in share capital on 30-Jun-05, 29-May-07 and
10-Aug-07 (takeover of Converium). (9) Temporary deletion between 22-Jun-09 and 21-Sep-09.
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Table 25: Supersector Constituents List - Technology (TEC)
Name ISIN Code Country Portfolio constituent
from: to:
1 Nokia FI0009000681 FI 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
2 Alcatel Lucent(1) FR0000130007 FR 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
3 SAP DE0007164600 DE 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
→ Business Objects(2) FR0004026250 FR 31-Dec-01 11-Feb-08
4 STMicroelectronics NL0000226223 IT 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
5 Capgemini FR0000125338 FR 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
6 Infineon Technologies DE0006231004 DE 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
7 Atos Origin(3) FR0000051732 FR 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
8 ASML Holding NL0006034001 NL 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
9 Indra Sistemas(4) ES0118594417 ES 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
10 Dassault Systems FR0000130650 FR 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
11 Neopost FR0000120560 FR 24-Jun-02 31-Oct-09
12 Iliad FR0004035913 FR 22-Sep-08 31-Oct-09
13 Wincor Nixdorf DE000A0CAYB2 DE 19-Jun-06 31-Oct-09
14 United Internet DE0005089031 DE 19-Mar-07 31-Oct-09
15 Software DE0003304002 DE 23-Mar-09 31-Oct-09
16 Aixtron DE000A0WMPJ6 DE 21-Sep-09 31-Oct-09
17 Tom Tom NL0000387058 NL 24-Sep-07 22-Dec-08
18 Tietoenator FI0009000277 FI 31-Dec-01 24-Sep-07
19 Getronics NL0000355915 NL 22-Mar-04 18-Sep-06
20 Oce´ NL0000354934 NL 31-Dec-01 19-Jun-06
21 T-Online International DE0005557706 DE 31-Dec-01 20-Mar-06
Notes: (1) Increase in share capital on 4-Dec-06 due to takeover of Lucent Technologies. (2) Takeover by
SAP. (3) Increase in share capital on 2-Feb-04. (4) Increase in share capital on 1-Feb-07, also constituent prior to
31-Dec-03.
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Table 26: Supersector Constituents List - Automobiles & Parts (ATO)
Name ISIN Code Country Portfolio constituent
from: to:
1 Volkswagen(1) DE0007664005 DE 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
2 Daimler DE0007100000 DE 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
3 BMW DE0005190003 DE 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
4 Renault(2) FR0000131906 FR 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
5 Peugeot FR0000121501 FR 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
6 Fiat(3) IT0001976403 IT 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
7 Porsche DE000PAH0038 DE 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
8 Continental(4) DE0005439004 DE 31-Dec-01 17-Sep-08
9 Michelin FR0000121261 FR 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
10 Pirelli & C.(5) IT0000072725 IT 19-Dec-05 31-Oct-09
11 Valeo FR0000130338 FR 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
12 Rheinmetall DE0007030009 DE 14-Jul-05 31-Oct-09
13 Nokian Tyres(6) FI0009005318 FI 9-May-05 31-Oct-09
Notes: (1) Free-float decrease due to changes in shareholder structure on 28-Dec-08. (2) Renault increases share
capital on 8-Apr-02. (3) Fiat increases share capital on 15-Nov-05. (4) Taken over by Schaeﬄer Group. (5) Also
constituent between 31-Dec-01 and 19-Dec-05. Increases share capital on 9-Jun-03. Takes over Pirelli on 4-Aug-03.
(6) Temporary deletion between 18-Sep-06 and 7-May-07.
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Table 27: Supersector Constituents List - Utilities (UTI)
Name ISIN Code Country Portfolio constituent
from: to:
1 EDF FR0010242511 FR 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
2 E.ON DE000ENAG999 DE 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
3 Enel IT0003128367 IT 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
→ Endesa(1) ES0130670112 ES 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
4 GDF Suez FR0010208488 FR 19-Sep-05 31-Oct-09
→ Suez(2) FR0000120529 FR 31-Dec-01 22-Jul-08
→ Electrabel(3) BE0003637486 BE 31-Dec-01 10-Jul-07
5 RWE DE0007037129 DE 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
6 Iberdrola ES0144580Y14 ES 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
7 Veolia Environnement FR0000124141 FR 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
8 EDP Energias de Portugal PTEDP0AM0009 PT 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
9 Fortum(4) FI0009007132 FI 20-Sep-04 31-Oct-09
10 Iberdrola Renovables ES0147645016 ES 23-Jun-08 31-Oct-09
11 Gas Natural ES0116870314 ES 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
→ Unio´n Fenosa(5) ES0181380710 ES 31-Dec-01 28-Apr-09
12 Public Power Corporation GRS434003000 GR 23-Jun-03 31-Oct-09
13 A2A(6) IT0001233417 IT 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
14 SNAM Rete Gas IT0003153415 IT 18-Mar-02 31-Oct-09
15 Terna IT0003242622 IT 20-Sep-04 31-Oct-09
16 EDP Renova´veis ES0127797019 PT 7-Jan-09 31-Oct-09
17 Verbund AT0000746409 AT 19-Dec-05 31-Oct-09
18 Red Ele´ctrica Corporation ES0173093115 ES 9-Oct-03 31-Oct-09
19 Edison IT0003152417 IT 1-Aug-03 18-Nov-05
20 Acea IT0001207098 IT 31-Dec-01 23-Jun-03
21 Hera IT0001250932 IT 25-Mar-08 21-Sep-09
22 Enaga´s(7) ES0130960018 ES 23-Sep-02 31-Oct-09
Notes: (1) Enel and Acciona take over Endesa on 5-Oct-2007. Deleted between 5-Oct-07 and 22-Sep-08. (2)
Suez merges with GDF on 22-Jul-08. (3) Suez takes over Electrabel on 10-Jul-07. (4) Classified as Utilities also
between 20-Sep-04 and 19-Apr-05. (5) Gas Natural takes over Unio´n Fenosa on 28-Apr-09. (6) AEM merges with
ASM and AMSA on 2-Jan-08 and changes name to A2A. (7) Classified as Utilities also betweenn 23-Sep-02 and
19-Dec-05.
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Table 28: Supersector Constituents List - Industrial Goods & Services (IGS)
Name ISIN Code Country Portfolio constituent
from: to:
1 Deutsche Post(1) DE0005552004 DE 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-10
2 Siemens DE0007236101 DE 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-10
3 EADS NL0000235190 NL 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-10
4 ThyssenKrupp DE0007500001 DE 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-10
5 Finmeccanica IT0003856405 IT 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-10
6 Schneider Electric FR0000121972 FR 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
7 Alstom FR0010220475 FR 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
8 Abertis Infraestructuras ES0111845014 ES 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
9 Suez Environnement FR0010613471 FR 22-Sep-08 31-Oct-09
10 Thales FR0000121329 FR 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
11 Safran(2) FR0000073272 FR 23-Sep-02 31-Oct-09
12 Man DE0005937007 DE 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
13 Atlantia IT0003506190 IT 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
14 Cintra ES0118900010 ES 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
15 Groupe Eurotunnel FR0010533075 FR 22-Dec-08 31-Oct-09
16 ADP FR0010340141 FR 19-Mar-07 31-Oct-09
17 TNT NL0000009066(3) NL 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
18 Legrand FR0010307819 FR 18-Sep-06 31-Oct-09
19 Fraport DE0005773303 DE 9-Dec-05 31-Oct-09
20 Vallourec FR0000120354 FR 10-Aug-05 31-Oct-09
21 Metso FI0009007835 FI 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
22 Randstad NL0000379121 NL 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
→ Vedior(4) NL0006005662 NL 31-Dec-01 16-May-08
23 GEA Group DE0006602006 DE 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
24 Nexans FR0000044448 FR 13-Feb-07 31-Oct-09
25 Wartsila FI0009003727 FI 20-Jun-05 31-Oct-09
26 MTU Aero Engines DE000A0D9PT0 DE 18-Aug-06 31-Oct-09
27 Prysmian IT0004176001 IT 23-Jun-08 31-Oct-09
28 Andritz AT0000730007 AT 24-Sep-07 31-Oct-09
29 Zodiac Aerospace FR0000125684 FR 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
30 Bekaert BE0003780948 BE 2-Oct-08 31-Oct-09
31 Tognum DE000A0N4P43 DE 24-Dec-07 31-Oct-09
32 Kone FI0009013403 FI 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
33 Vopak NL0000393007 NL 23-Jun-08 31-Oct-09
34 Imtech NL0006055329 NL 23-Jun-08 31-Oct-09
35 DCC IE0002424939 IE 23-Dec-02 31-Oct-09
36 Bureau Veritas FR0006174348 FR 30-Apr-08 31-Oct-09
37 Gemalto NL0000400653 NL 23-Jun-08 31-Oct-09
Notes: (1). Also constituent before 23-Dec-02. (2) Also constituent before 19-Sep-05. (3) Also constituent
before 19-Nov-02. (4) takeover.
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Table 29: Supersector Constituents List - Industrial Goods & Services (IGS) (cont.)
Name ISIN Code Country Portfolio constituent
from: to:
38 SGL Carbon DE0007235301 DE 7-Aug-07 31-Oct-09
39 Konecranes FI0009005870 FI 24-Dec-07 31-Oct-09
40 Zardoya Otis ES0184933812 ES 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
41 Brisa PTBRI0AM0000 PT 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
42 O¨sterreichische Post AT0000APOST4 AT 19-Jan-09 21-Dec-09
43 SAPRR FR0006807004 FR 3-Mar-05 19-Mar-07
44 Corporate Express NL0000852861 NL 22-Dec-03 24-Dec-07
45 Heidelberg(5) DE0007314007 DE 31-Dec-01 23-Jun-08
46 AGFA Gevaert(6) BE0003755692 BE 24-Jun-02 24-Dec-07
47 Cargotec Corporation FI0009013429 FI 1-Jun-05 22-Sep-08
48 Hagemeyer(7) NL0000355477 NL 31-Dec-01 12-Mar-08
49 Grafton IE00B00MZ448 IE 22-Sep-03 22-Sep-08
50 Huhtamaki FI0009000459 FI 31-Dec-01 18-Dec-06
51 Stork NL0000390672 NL 19-Sep-05 19-Mar-07
52 Epcos DE0005128003 DE 31-Dec-01 20-Dec-04
53 Outotec FI0009014575 FI 4-Oct-07 22-Dec-08
54 Medion DE0006605009 DE 31-Dec-01 20-Sep-04
55 Singulus Technologies DE0007238909 DE 31-Dec-01 22-Mar-04
56 Buderus DE0005278006 DE 31-Dec-01 7-Jul-03
Notes: (5) Temporary deletion between 24-Mar-03 and 23-Jul-04. (6) Also constituent before 22-Sep-03. (7)
Temporary deletion between 22-Sep-03 and 14-Jun-06.
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Table 30: Supersector Constituents List - Chemicals (CHM)
Name ISIN Code Country Portfolio constituent
from: to:
1 Bayer DE000BAY0017 DE 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
2 BASF DE0005151005 DE 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
3 Linde(1) DE0006483001 DE 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
4 Air Liquide FR0000120073 FR 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
5 AkzoNobel NL0000009132 NL 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
6 Solvay BE0003470755 BE 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
7 DSM NL0000009827 NL 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
8 Arkema FR0010313833 FR 18-May-06 31-Oct-09
9 Wacker Chemie DE000WCH8881 DE 19-Mar-07 31-Oct-09
10 Lanxess DE0005470405 DE 31-Jan-05 31-Oct-09
11 K+S DE0007162000 DE 25-Jun-04 31-Oct-09
12 Umicore BE0003884047 BE 2-Jan-04 31-Oct-09
13 Symrise DE000SYM9999 DE 10-Oct-07 31-Oct-09
14 Rhodia(2) FR0010479956 FR 9-Mar-06 23-Mar-09
Notes: (1) Classified as Chemicals also before 23-Dec-02. (2) Temporary deletion between 22-Dec-03 and
9-Mar-06.
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Table 31: Supersector Constituents List - Food & Beverage (FOB)
Name ISIN Code Country Portfolio constituent
from: to:
1 Anheuser-Busch InBev BE0003793107 BE 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
2 Unilever NL0000009355 NL 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
3 Danone FR0000120644 FR 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
→ Royal Numico(1) NL0000375616 NL 31-Dec-01 14-Nov-07
4 Pernod Ricard FR0000120693 FR 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
5 Heineken Holding(2) NL0000008977 NL 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
→ Heineken NV NL0000009165 NL 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
6 Suedzucker(3) DE0007297004 DE 23-Sep-02 31-Oct-09
7 Coca-Cola HBC GRS104003009 GR 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
8 Parmalat IT0003826473 IT 20-Mar-06 31-Oct-09
9 Kerry Grp IE0004906560 IE 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
10 Ebro Puleva(4) ES0112501012 ES 23-Dec-02 31-Oct-09
11 Nutreco(5) NL0000375400 NL 22-Sep-08 31-Oct-09
12 CSM NL0000852549 NL 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
13 C&C Group IE00B010DT83 IE 19-Sep-05 22-Dec-08
Notes: (1) Takeover. (2) Dual-listed. (3) Temporary deletion between 19-Mar-07 and 23-Mar-09. (4) Temporary
deletion between 24-Dec-07 and 22-Dec-08. (5) Also constituent before 23-Dec-02.
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Table 32: Supersector Constituents List - Media (MDI)
Name ISIN Code Country Portfolio constituent
from: to:
1 Vivendi FR0000127771 FR 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
2 Lagarde`re FR0000130213 FR 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
3 Publicis Groupe FR0000130577 FR 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
4 SES LU0088087324 LU 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
5 Mediaset IT0001063210 IT 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
6 Wolters Kluwer NL0000395903 NL 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
7 Eutelsat Communication FR0010221234 FR 12-Mar-08 31-Oct-09
8 JCDecaux FR0000077919 FR 23-Dec-02 31-Oct-09
9 TF1 FR0000054900 FR 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
10 Sanoma FI0009007694 FI 22-Sep-03 31-Oct-09
11 Teleperformance FR0000051807 FR 22-Sep-08 31-Oct-09
12 M6 Me´tropole TV(1) FR0000053225 FR 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
13 Reed Elsevier NL0006144495 NL 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
14 Zon Multimedia PTZON0AM0006 PT 24-Dec-07 31-Oct-09
15 Pagesjaunes FR0010096354 FR 20-Sep-04 31-Oct-09
16 Prisa ES0171743117 ES 31-Dec-01 20-Mar-06
→ Sogecable(2) ES0178483139 ES 31-Dec-01 15-May-08
17 ProSiebenSat.1 Media DE0007771172 DE 22-Dec-03 23-Jun-08
18 Thomson(3) FR0000184533 FR 31-Dec-01 22-Sep-08
19 Havas FR0000121881 FR 31-Dec-01 19-Jun-06
20 RCS Mediagroup IT0003039010 IT 31-Dec-01 19-Dec-05
21 Independent Newspapers IE0004614818 IE 31-Dec-01 24-Dec-07
22 Mondadori Group IT0001469383 IT 31-Dec-01 19-Dec-05
23 Antena 3 ES0109427734 ES 20-Dec-04 19-Mar-07
24 SEAT Pagine Gialle IT0001389920 IT 31-Dec-01 23-Jun-08
25 VNU NL0000389872 NL 31-Dec-01 14-Jun-06
Notes: (1) Temporary deletion between 24-Jun-02 and 8-Apr-04 and between 24-Sep-07 and 23-Mar-09. (2)
Takeover. (3) Also constituent prior to 19-Sep-05.
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Table 33: Supersector Constituents List - Healthcare (HCR)
Name ISIN Code Country Portfolio constituent
from: to:
1 Sanofi-Aventis FR0000120578 FR 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
→ Aventis(1) FR0000130460 FR 31-Dec-01 28-Jul-04
2 Fresenius(2) DE0005785638 DE 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
3 Merck DE0006599905 DE 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
4 UCB BE0003739530 BE 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
5 Essilor International FR0000121667 FR 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
6 STADA Arzneimittel DE0007251803 DE 23-Dec-02 31-Oct-09
7 Rhoen Klinikum DE0007042301 DE 26-Jun-07 31-Oct-09
8 Qiagen NL0000240000 NL 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
9 Biomerieux FR0010096479 FR 22-Dec-08 31-Oct-09
10 Elan Corporation IE0003072950 IE 31-Dec-01 31-Oct-09
11 Grifols ES0171996012 ES 4-Apr-07 31-Oct-09
12 Orion(3) FI0009014377 FI 22-Dec-08 31-Oct-09
13 Crucell NL0000358562 NL 23-Mar-09 31-Oct-09
14 Intercell AT0000612601 AT 22-Sep-08 31-Oct-09
15 Schering DE0007172009 DE 31-Dec-01 18-Sep-06
16 Faes Farma ES0134950F36 ES 19-Mar-07 21-Sep-09
17 Zeltia ES0184940817 ES 31-Dec-01 20-Mar-06
Notes: (1) Takeover by Sanofi-Synthe´labo and renamed Sanofi-Aventis. (2) Fresenius Medical Care is also listed
but partially owned by Fresenius. (3) B Shares, also constituent between 23-Dec-02 and 22-Sep-03 and between
28-Jul-05 and 18-Sep-06.
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Figure 1: PDF At-the-money Implied Volatilities.
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Figure 2: PDF Standardized Risk Reversal.
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Figure 3: PDF Standardized Strangle.
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Figure 4: Distance-to-Default based on Option-implied IV.
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Figure 5: Forward looking Distance-to-Default series. 30-Sep-2002 - 31-Jul-2009
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Figure 6: Forward looking Distance-to-Default series. 31-Dec-2004 - 31-Jul-2009
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Figure 7: Put-derived Forward looking DD series. 30-Sep-2002 - 31-Jul-2009
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Figure 8: Put-derived Forward looking DD series. 31-Dec-2004 - 31-Jul-2009
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Figure 9: Forward looking vis--vis historical DD series. End-of-month data.
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Figure 10: Forward looking DD vis--vis historical DD series. Monthly averages.
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Figure 11: GARCH(1,1)-derived DD series. 30-Sep-2002 - 31-Jul-2009
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Figure 12: GARCH(1,1)-derived DD series. 31-Dec-2004 - 31-Jul-2009
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Figure 13: Sectoral Distance-to-Default Series. December-2001 - October-2009
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Figure 14: Sectoral DD Series Pairwise Correlation
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Figure 15: Sectoral DD Series Pairwise Correlation (series in first differences)
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